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Falling Behind or Catching Up?
Developing Countries in the Era of Globalization
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by Erich Gundlach and Peter Nunnenkamp
Globalization improves the prospects for developing countries (DCs) to catch up economic-
ally with industrialized countries. But not all DCs will automatically benefit from globaliza-
tion. Some DCs even face the risk of being delinked from the international division of labor.
Differences in DC economic policies ultimately determine whether there will be a deepening
divide between rich and poor countries in the world economy.
Many observers draw an overly pessimistic picture of the perspectives of DCs in the era of
globalization because of missing institutionalized links to regional integration schemes in
Europe and North America, a low level of interfirm technology cooperation between indus-
trialized countries and DCs, and a high concentration of foreign direct investment (FDD
flows on only a few DC hosts. However, such concerns are largely unfounded:
— Asian DCs are most successful in globalization although they have remained outside insti-
tutionalized integration schemes, while ACP countries have not made much progress de-
spite their preferential access to EU markets.
— Technology transfers between industrialized countries and DCs mainly occur through FDI
and trade in capital goods, rather than through interfirm technology cooperation. Recent
trends in FDI and international trade strongly support the proposition that DCs have be-
come closely integrated into globalization strategies.
— A high concentration of FDI flows on a few DC hosts does not imply that new attractive
locations cannot compete for international capital. Admittedly, it is true that between
two thirds and three quarters of total FDI flows to DCs have persistently been absorbed
by ten host economies. But the country composition of this group has changed over time.
Globalization implies an increase in international investment cooperation. Case studies for se-
lected DC industries show that FDI prevails in industries applying sophisticated technologies,
whereas licensing and subcontracting are favored when production processes are standard-
' ized. Policy interventions may limit the choices open to investing foreign firms and, thereby,
cause substitution effects between different forms of globalization or hinder globalization
at all.
The quality of DC economic policies determines whether these countries will succeed in join-
ing the globalization club. The experience of the frontrunners among DCs suggests some
basic policy conclusions:
— Openness towards world markets is a precondition for becoming involved in globalization
strategies of transnational corporations. Liberalizing all forms of international investment
cooperation and removing barriers to international trade should rank high on the policy
agenda of DCs.
— Under conditions of globalized production, DC governments are increasingly constrained
in pursuing policies of their own liking. Those DCs characterized by pronounced macro-
economic instability are relatively unattractive locations for international investors.
— Investment in physical and human capital plays a crucial role in enabling DCs to participate
in globalization. Economic policies that discourage domestic saving and investment must
be avoided. Financial market reforms are needed in DCs characterized by financial repres-
sion and inefficient intermediation between savers and investors. A better education of
the workforce is required for a successful application of new technologies that become
available through globalization.
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ISSN 0455-0420A. Driving Forces of Globalization
Looking back, next generation's economists may
be puzzled by the structure of the world econ-
omy of 1995. Today, developing countries
(DCs) and the former Soviet bloc account for
about one half of world output and the rich in-
dustrialized countries for the other.
1 But this
picture is likely to change rapidly over the next
25 years: At current growth rates, the rich
world's share of global output could shrink to
less than two fifths by 2020. Although the abso-
lute magnitudes are uncertain, it is safe to as-
sume that there will be an enormous shift of
economic power from today's rich countries to
what is still labelled DCs, and especially to
Asian DCs.
2 This shift is the likely result of the
ongoing globalization of economic activities,
i.e., the increasing worldwide integration of
markets for goods, capital and last not least, la-
bor.
Globalization refers to an evolving pattern of
cross-border activities of firms involving inter-
national investment, trade and cooperation for
purposes of product development, production
and sourcing, and marketing. Complex patterns
of cross-border activities increasingly character-
ize the international economic system and distin-
guish it from the earlier predominance of arm's
length trade in finished goods. Taken at face
value, globalization is by no means a principally
new phenomenon, since the globalizing economy
is first and foremost an expression for an in-
crease in the international division of labor.
What is different this time is the sheer weight of
new competition, the new mobility of capital and
technology, and the fact that more Third World
workers are educated and so capable of operat-
ing even complex machinery. Hence, economic
power is dispersed among more actors, and in-
terregional competition is heightened. Does this
process end up in a deepening divide between
rich and poor countries, or will the next 25 years
be a time of unprecedented opportunity for
DCs? And will globalization foster or retard
their industrialization? To answer such ques-
tions, it is necessary to understand why global-
ization has emerged and how it actually pro-
ceeds.
The main driving force behind globalization
strategies of firms is not different from what
drives international trade. Firms seek to maxi-
mize profits, given the constraints they face.
Changing or vanishing constraints imply new
profit opportunities and thus require new strate-
gies of firms. In a way, globalization is nothing
more than the entrepreneurial response to a
changing environment, while the leitmotiv of
firm behavior — constrained profit maximiza-
tion — remains unchanged.
One of the most important reasons for glob-
alization is that large parts of the world have
become industrialized since the Second World
War. Many DCs, especially in East and
Southeast Asia, have attained, or are about to
attain, the status of an industrialized country.
This successful catching-up has increased the
number of suppliers on world markets. Global
production capacities and international competi-
tion have increased, and so have the opportuni-
ties to exploit market niches. This process will
gain momentum once the large markets of the
P.R. of China, India and Central and Eastern
Europe, which represent roughly one half of the
world's population, will be fully integrated into
the world economy. Put differently, the con-
straint of market size, which may have hindered
globalization strategies in the past, has become
less relevant and probably no longer applies at
all.
At the same time, other constraints that pre-
vented firms from implementing globalization
strategies have disappeared. Thanks to the mi-
croelectronics revolution, communications tech-
nologies have undergone a dramatic change dur-
ing the last decade, and new production and
organization technologies such as CAD (com-
puter-aided design) and CIM (computer-inte-
grated manufacturing) have evolved. Successive
GATT rounds have substantially reduced tariff
barriers to trade, and capital markets have also
been liberalized, especially during the 1980s.Many business services have become interna-
tionally tradable. As transaction and communi-
cations costs fall, the proximity between sellers
and buyers, which has traditionally been con-
sidered to be essential for many services, figures
less prominently. Most important in this regard
is that financial capital has gone global. Nowa-
days, the financial centers of the world economy
provide the possibility for 24-hour trading in all
sorts of financial assets. The deregulation of
other business services such as banking and in-
surance also offers new opportunities for the
tradability of services. Hence, standardized busi-
ness services have become available around the
world, which, in turn, has made the international
fragmentation of production feasible. As a con-
sequence of all this, not only the constraints for
firms, but also for governments have completely
changed.
Globalization shapes the world economy in
different ways. Most obviously, international
trade and capital flows are affected. Over the
last 30 years or so, international trade has grown
faster on average than production (GATT vari-
ous issues), implying a more integrated world
economy. Closer integration brings about oppor-
tunities for specialization, and hence increases
interdependencies. This is highlighted by chan-
ges in the structure of world trade. For example,
international sourcing, i.e., the purchase of inter-
mediate inputs from foreign sources, has grown
faster than domestic sourcing and now accounts
for about half of all imports by major countries
(OECD 1994d); intraindustry trade has risen
significantly in almost all OECD countries, and
also between Japan and its Asian neighbors in
physical and human capital-intensive products,
while intrafirm trade seems to have kept pace
with the increase in total trade (Nunnenkamp et
al. 1994).
In contrast to relatively steady changes in the
pattern of international trade, especially during
the last decade, a dramatic increase in the inter-
national redistribution of ownership has taken
place. Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI),
for instance, have grown even three to four times
faster than international trade (Figure 1). In
addition to rising FDI flows, other forms of in-
ternational investment cooperation such as li-
censing, joint ventures, offshore processing, mi-
nority participations, and so-called strategic alli-
ances have become more important in recent
years. As a rough approximation, the number of
international interfirm cooperation agreements
has doubled over the 1980s (OECD 1994d).
These cooperation agreements tend to involve
large firms from Europe, the United States, and
Japan, and they are concentrated in sectors such
as electronics, aerospace, telecommunications,
computers and automobiles.
Figure 1 - World FDI and Trade Flows, 1982-1993
(1982=100)
1,200 -r
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
aTotal FDI outflows. — ^Vorld merchandise exports plus exports
of commercial services.
Source: GATT International Trade, Trends and Statistics
(various issues), IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
Yearbook (various issues).
Although all three aspects of globalization —
international trade, FDI, and international inter-
firm cooperation — are dominated by OECD
countries so far, the dynamic East and Southeast
Asian economies are rapidly becoming involved,
as are some countries in Latin America and in
Central and Eastern Europe. Given its current
move towards economic reform, India may be
the next giant eagerly waiting to join the glob-
alization club. Those DCs which have already
joined appear to have two things in common,
despite rather dramatic differences in per capita
income:
3 a domestic economic policy which is
compatible with an integration into world mar-
kets, and a large supply of workers which have
received at least a minimum amount of formal
education at school. Improvements in formal
education, i.e., increases in the average years of
schooling, enable workers in DCs to compete
with low- and medium-skilled workers in richcountries if governments do not hinder interna-
tional trade and capital flows. No wonder, pub-
lic debate considers globalization mainly as a
threat to labor markets in industrialized coun-
tries. Consequently, recent studies focus on the
implications of globalization for earnings and
employment prospects of low-skilled workers in
rich countries (Lawrence and Slaughter 1993;
Nunnenkamp et al. 1994; Wood 1994). The im-
plications of globalization for DCs, however,
have so far largely escaped the attention of the
economics profession.
In the following, we try to change this unsat-
isfactory state of affairs. We portray the ongo-
ing process of globalization involving DCs, and
discuss why the gains from globalization are un-
evenly distributed among DCs up to now. Chap-
ter B reviews the rationale behind different glob-
alization strategies which are relevant with
respect to DCs. Chapter C presents an overview
of recent trends in international business coop-
eration through non-equity interfirm alliances
and FDI in DCs. Chapter D examines the impli-
cations of globalization for selected industries in
DCs. Chapter E tries to assess the future posi-
tion of DCs in the global economy, thereby high-
lighting the determinants for attracting foreign
risk capital, the role of new technologies, and the
risks involved in current policy trends in in-
dustrialized countries. Chapter F summarizes
the main findings.
B. Major Forms of Globalization
Globalization proceeds through different
means.
4 What they have in common is some
kind of international interfirm cooperation,
usually involving cross-border flows of technol-
ogy, goods, capital, or intangible assets, or com-
binations of these. The specific instrument cho-
sen for participation in worldwide production,
sourcing and marketing depends on a number of
country-, industry-, and firm size-specific char-
acteristics. The whole spectrum of possibilities
firms can choose from for going global ranges
from traditional arm's length trade to FDI. In the
former, international interfirm cooperation is
restricted to conventional forms of selling and
buying goods or services, without any changes
in the respective ownership of firms. In the
latter, ownership is redistributed internationally,
typically through exchanges of majority equity
stakes. In between these two extremes there is a
grey area where so-called non-equity forms of
cooperation (NEC) dominate alliances between
domestic and foreign firms.
I. NEC versus FDI
NEC covers a broad and heterogeneous range of
cross-border activities of companies. They in-
clude in particular: R&D cooperation; joint
ventures with minor foreign equity stakes; the
supply of technology or trademarks through li-
censing agreements; production sharing arrange-
ments, international subcontracting that involves
firms with a local majority stake; as well as con-
tracts on franchising and turnkey projects. The
common denominator of the various types of
NEC is that tangible or intangible assets are
supplied by a foreign company to a local enter-
prise, while local interests in the host country
retain majority or full ownership. The foreign
company's equity stake, if any, does not consti-
tute ownership control, though NEC may entail
a significant degree of effective control by other
means.
It should be noted that there is no unanimous
border line of foreign equity stakes that would
adequately serve to distinguish NEC from FDI
(see also IMF 1977). The relevant criterion for
FDI is that the foreign investor has an effective
voice in the management of an enterprise. Yet
effective control does not only depend on the
proportion of foreign equity stakes, but also on
whether the remaining shares are widely dis-
persed or rather concentrated. Such information
required for clear-cut differentiation between
FDI and NEC is generally not available. Conse-quently, there is no alternative but to refer to the
proportion of foreign ownership in defining FDI.
The border line applied differs considerably be-
tween different sources. In balance of payments
statistics the percentage chosen is typically quite
low, ranging from 25 percent down to 10 per-
cent.
Furthermore, the relation between NEC and
FDI is not straightforward from an analytical
point of view. The ambiguities are similar to
those known from the trade-FDI nexus and
largely stem from economic policy interventions.
The positive effect of past and present exports
on FDI, postulated by the theory of optimal
timing of FDI, may be neutralized if large and
important markets are not accessible via exports
and if FDI is undertaken to overcome protection-
ist trade barriers. Trade liberalization may then
have even a negative effect on FDI. Similarly,
NEC may be a second-best alternative to FDI if
the latter is regulated or even prohibited. Global-
ization through NEC might then become less
relevant once FDI restrictions are lifted.
II. Substitution Effects between NEC
and FDI
Substitution effects between NEC and FDI (as
well as trade and FDI) reflect that corporate
strategies and government regulations are inter-
twined. Until the early 1980s, many countries
were concerned about "foreign dominance" by
transnational corporations (TNCs) in their
economies. Especially in DCs, globalization
through FDI was hindered by a host of restric-
tions, ranging from not permitting any foreign
equity investment in strategic industries to per-
formance requirements in terms of local content
and export obligations.
5 Such a restrictive policy
stance left no alternative but to globalize via
NEC, or at least increased the attractiveness of
NEC relative to FDI. At the same time, a re-
course to NEC suggests that entrepreneurial ad-
aptation to policy interventions reduced the ef-
fectiveness of the latter in achieving the host
country's objective to limit foreign involvement
in the economy. Given that NEC, too, involved
effective control by foreign companies, majority
ownership by the host countries was insufficient
to guarantee exclusive local control.
The limited effectiveness of government regu-
lations may have contributed to the more liberal
stance towards FDI since the 1980s.
6 In many
DCs, however, the significant relaxation of FDI
restrictions was an attempt to overcome foreign
exchange constraints and to improve the chances
for a closer integration into the world economy.
Even if higher FDI inflows were induced by
such a move, the effectiveness of the policy
change may again suffer from substitution
effects. A rise in FDI would then go hand in
hand with less globalization through NEC; if so,
an earlier rise in NEC would turn out to be tem-
porary.
Policy-induced substitution effects notwith-
standing, the degree of globalization is likely to
be underestimated when NEC is ignored. Two
factors are of particular relevance with respect
to the growth of NEC: (i) general changes in
TNC perceptions on the advantages of NEC,
which are of a longer-term nature and independ-
ent of policy-induced biases in corporate deci-
sion making, and (ii) industry characteristics
that have as a consequence that NEC is the su-
perior way of globalization in certain sectors,
while there may be no alternative to FDI in other
sectors.
While FDI provides a way for the host coun-
try to share economic risks with foreign inves-
tors, TNCs may aim at risk diversification by
unravelling the FDI package. NEC offers vari-
ous options to this effect. Political risks in gen-
eral, and expropriation risks in particular can be
contained in the case of joint ventures with local
majority stakes. By providing intangible assets
through licensing, investment and operation
costs are shifted to local or other foreign part-
ners. Subcontracting implies that the effects of
fluctuations in final demand are shared with the
subcontracting firm in the host country. Finan-
cial risks can be diversified by delegating the fi-
nancing of investment projects to commercial
banks.
The favorable risk properties of NEC render
it easier for newcomers to go global, especially
in the case of smaller companies for which the
potential of intrafirm diversification of risks islimited.
7 For these companies, NEC offers the
opportunity to compete with established TNCs
in world markets, despite an internationally less
diversified equity structure. As a consequence,
more FDI by market leaders is likely to provoke
more NEC by market followers. FDI and NEC
can thus be expected to be complements rather
than substitutes.
III. Industry Characteristics and
International Investment
Cooperation
Industry characteristics can also explain why
different corporate globalization strategies are
followed at the same time. It is well known from
the eclectic theory of FDI (Dunning 1977) that
owners of intangible assets prefer to maintain
control over the use of such assets if external
markets are inefficient and the transfer of assets
through market exchange involves high transac-
tion costs. Hence, it can reasonably be assumed
that the suitability of different globalization
strategies depends on the asset-specific signifi-
cance of market imperfections and transaction
costs. For example, market inefficiencies are
supposed to have an impact in the case of own-
ership advantages related to products and mar-
keting so that internalization is most likely to
occur through FDI (Kumar 1989). As concerns
ownership advantages related to process tech-
nology, the propensity to FDI is expected to be
relatively high in the case of innovative tech-
nologies, whose management requires particular
skills of the owner's employees. By contrast, li-
censing is expected to be a prime vehicle of
globalization if standardization is well advanced
(Caves 1974; Teece 1981).
The importance of intangible assets related to
products and markets, and the technologies ap-
plied vary across industries. Hence, the propen-
sity to internalize and the preferred mode of in-
ternanzation will be industry-specific (Dunning
1981; Kumar 1989). Globalization may be do-
minated by FDI in industries producing differ-
entiated goods, for the sale of which brand
names and quality control feature prominently.
The same applies when globalization necessi-
tates the transfer of highly skilled personnel, for
example, for purpose of management and orga-
nization, marketing, and R&D. By contrast,
NEC may be favored in industries where
knowledge is embodied in capital goods, pro-
duction processes do not require extensive
supervision, and the R&D intensity of produc-
tion is low.
Finally, country characteristics may shape
globalization strategies. DCs may prefer FDI in
some industries and NEC in others. Many DCs
have built up considerable domestic capacities in
management, technological development, and
marketing. Depending on the advances made in
these areas, they may rely on local resources to
the largest extent possible in order to reduce
foreign exchange costs (Oman 1989). Conse-
quently, they will prefer NEC in industries that
can be run locally once specific assets are sup-
plied from abroad, for example through licens-
ing. By contrast, the package of foreign assets
typically embodied in FDI will be welcomed
particularly in industries where the bundle of
necessary inputs is generally not available lo-
cally.
C. Overview of Recent Trends in International Business Cooperation
I. Empirical Evidence on Non-Equity
Cooperation with DCs
Any empirical assessment of the significance of
NEC and its relation to FDI suffers from serious
data shortcomings. This is all the more so in the
case of DCs. In contrast to the comprehensive,
though not always consistent data collection on
FDI, the available statistical information on
NEC is fragmentary and incomplete, especially
with respect to DCs. Contractual arrangements
between companies of different legislations
largely escape balance of payments statistics.The flow of goods, services and income induced
by such arrangements is typically hard to iden-
tify, as the relevant items are included in more
broadly defined statistical categories. Finally,
FDI and NEC are sometimes difficult to disen-
tangle.
Notwithstanding the lack of comprehensive
data on NEC, there appears to be a fairly broad
consensus that globalization has not only been
pursued via FDI but also through various forms
of collaborative ventures.
8 Some empirical sup-
port for this view comes from the Maastricht
Economic Research Institute on Innovation and
Technology (MERIT), which runs a data base
on more than 10,000 ventures (Hagedoorn and
Schakenraad 1990: Appendix I).
This source basically relies on newspaper re-
ports on business events. Two obvious limita-
tions are that deals between small and medium-
size firms (SMEs) are more likely to go unre-
corded, and that dissolution agreements are un-
likely to be published. A selection bias also re-
sults from the fact that the MERIT data base
only includes interfirm agreements that contain
some arrangements for transferring technology
or cooperating in research; mere production or
marketing joint ventures are not taken into ac-
count. Furthermore, although partnerships in-
volving majority ownership are explicitly ex-
cluded, some cases may include equity partici-
pation large enough to qualify as FDI. These
shortcomings notwithstanding, the MERIT data
base provides the most comprehensive system-
atic stocktaking of international interfirm coop-
eration agreements up to now.
The MERIT data (Hagedoorn and Schaken-
raad 1990) reveal that the most commonly cited
reasons for interfirm cooperation agreements
which involve some form of technology transfer
were to gain access to a market, to exploit com-
plementary technologies and to reduce the time
required for innovation. Taken together, these
motives account for more than 80 percent of all
cases considered. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that basic R&D is rarely found to be a
subject of cooperation, as it only accounts for 4
percent of all alliances reported. This is proba-
bly because basic R&D concerns the core activ-
ity of companies, which they are reluctant to
share with other independent firms. This finding
supports the above proposition that different
globalization strategies are complementary to
each other, the mode of globalization depending
on the importance and specificity of particular
corporate assets and the asset-specific transac-
tion costs involved.
As expected, the relative importance of differ-
ent motives to enter interfirm cooperation
agreements varies between sectors. Technologi-
cal complementarity and reduced innovation pe-
riods are less relevant in motivating cooperation
in mature industries. The latter comprise chemi-
cals, consumer electronics, food and, to a certain
extent, also the automobile industry, which to-
gether account for 17 percent of the total num-
ber of alliances. Market-related motivations
dominate in these industries. By contrast, tech-
nology-related motivations dominate in biotech-
nology, new materials, industrial automation and
software, and partly also in aviation. However,
alliances with respect to basic R&D activities
are of minor relevance in most of these sectors,
too. This suggests that even for those alliances
which aim at some sort of technology transfer,
interfirm cooperation is not the preferred
globalization strategy when it comes to highly
firm-specific assets and the core activities of
companies. In these cases, FDI seems to domi-
nate.
This general picture gives some clues as to
the expected empirical pattern of interfirm tech-
nology partnering between industrialized coun-
tries and DCs. If, as suggested by the MERIT
data base, more than half of all interfirm tech-
nology partnerships can be explained by the
motives "reducing innovation time" and "search-
ing for technological complementarities," co-
operation in this area can be expected to be
largely a game between equally advanced play-
ers with a similar level of technological capa-
bilities. Interfirm technology partnering within
the Triad will then dominate, especially in tech-
nologically advanced sectors where the above
mentioned motives have a still higher weight.
Cooperation between firms from the Triad and
DCs would not provide the required match of
partners involved and is, thus, rather unlikely in
this area. If any, Triad-DC technological coop-eration should have a role to play in more ma-
ture sectors, for which market-related motives
have a larger weight. It must be recalled, how-
ever, that the MERIT data base displays a sam-
ple selection bias as it only considers interfirm
cooperation agreements which involve some
transfer of technology: While it does make sense
to expect a transfer of technology between rich
and poor countries, a priori it is not clear why
this transfer should proceed through interfirm
cooperation, rather than through FDI which
would allow the investing partner to maintain
control over the technology transferred.
In analyzing patterns in international interfirm
technology partnering, Freeman and Hagedoorn
(1994) differentiate between what they call
"strategic technology partnering" and "interfirm
technology transfers." The first category sub-
sumes agreements such as joint R&D and other
innovative activities, while the latter includes
agreements whereby one company provides ac-
cess to its technology to another company, with
licensing agreements as a leading example.
The international distribution of strategic
technology alliances in 1980-1989 is reported in
Table 1. These alliances are further classified by
mode of cooperation and by field of technology.
Taken at face value, the overall numbers indi-
cate an extremely high concentration of strategic
technology partnerships among industrialized
countries. Over 95 percent of the strategic tech-
nology alliances have been established between
companies from industrialized countries, and
just 2.3 percent between a Triad company and a
firm from one of the newly industrializing
economies (NIEs); a meagre 1.5 percent cover
alliances between Triad companies and compa-
nies from less advanced DCs (LDCs). While the
involvement of DCs, notably LDCs, in strategic
technology partnering is generally small, some
additional information can be gained from the
structure of international strategic alliances.
First, considering the mode of cooperation,
the relative importance of strategic alliances for
firms in DCs is largest in the category "joint
ventures," which is defined as including a num-
ber of corporate objectives other than R&D. By
contrast, the weight of DCs is extremely low
with regard to joint R&D activities. This is al-
most so by definition, considering the less ad-
vanced technological capabilities of DC part-
ners. As argued above, their marginal involve-
ment in joint R&D does not imply that DCs are
delinked from technology transfers. Rather, stra-
tegic alliances are largely irrelevant in this re-
spect.
Table 1 ^-International Distribution of Strategic Technology Alliances, 1980-1989
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Source: Based on Freeman and Hagedoorn (1994).10
Second, the classification by field of technol-
ogy indicates that the observed pattern is influ-
enced by the technological intensity of sectors.
Strategic alliances within the Triad strongly
dominate in high-tech sectors such as biotech-
nology, medical technology, computers and
software. There is a larger role for strategic alli-
ances involving DCs in relatively mature fields
such as automotive technology, chemicals (the
only case in which Triad-LDC alliances are
more numerous than Triad-NIE alliances), mi-
croelectronics, and food and beverages. Firms
from Asian NIEs figure most prominently on the
side of DCs.
Not surprisingly, a similar pattern reemerges
from the analysis of interfirm technology trans-
fer agreements, derived from a smaller sample of
1,700 cooperative ventures. In the definition
used by MERIT, technology transfers mainly
include licensing agreements, technology sharing
agreements, and joint ventures with a licensing
agreement. Again, interfirm cooperation within
the Triad dominates the sample, although to a
somewhat lesser extent than in the case of stra-
tegic alliances. About 90 percent of all technol-
ogy transfer agreements registered are between
industrialized countries. Triad-NIE technology
transfers account for about 6 percent, and
Triad-LDC deals for about 4 percent. With re-
gard to the sectoral distribution, the pattern
found for strategic alliances is repeated by and
large. However, substantial shares of technology
transfer agreements between firms from the
Triad and Asian NIEs are reported for automo-
tive technology and microelectronics (about 20
percent) as well as consumer electronics (about
10 percent) (Freeman and Hagedoorn 1994).
The somewhat larger weight of DCs, and espe-
cially the considerable involvement of Asian
NIEs, confirms a priori expectations. Interfirm
technology transfers, as defined by MERIT, are
much less R&D-intensive than strategic alli-
ances. Accordingly, cooperation between part-
ners at different stages of technological devel-
opment seems to be a more reasonable alterna-
tive to FDI in this category.
Two examples for technologically motivated
alliances illustrate some characteristics of tech-
nology cooperation between Triad and DC firms
(San 1992), namely the joint venture between
Taiwan's Acer Group and Texas Instruments in
the field of information technology, and alliances
between government-backed firms in Taiwan
(NDL and IIS) and IBM in the software indus-
try. In both cases, the aim was to upgrade the
technological capabilities of Taiwanese firms,
and to improve their marketing in domestic and
foreign markets. The experience of Taiwan sug-
gests that strategic alliances with foreign part-
ners are more likely to be established by larger
and more capital-intensive enterprises. Hence,
differences in factor endowments could be an-
other reason for the rather limited evidence of
technology partnerships between Triad and DC
firms, considering that enterprises in DCs are
generally less capital-intensive than in industrial-
ized countries.
Tentative empirical evidence on the structure
of Triad-DC business alliances which do not ex-
clusively focus on the transfer of technology,
may be derived from a 1991 survey of Canadian
industrial and merchandising companies. These
companies had established alliances with firms
in eight countries in East and Southeast Asia
(Hung 1991, 1992) (Table 2). As can be expect-
ed for cooperation between unequal partners,
more than two thirds of the business alliances
were market-oriented, i.e., the underlying motive
of Canadian firms was to gain access to local
markets. Production- and technology-oriented
alliances taken together only accounted for
about one fifth of all cases. The figures also in-
dicate that relatively advanced DCs have better
Table 2 - Distribution of Canadian Interfirm Alliances
with Partners in Asian DCs, 1991






























aHong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan. — Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Thailand. — 'Collaborative research, technology transfer,
licensing. — ^Contract manufacturing. —
 eMarket development, local
distribution.
Source: Based on Hung (1991; 1992).11
prospects to participate in business alliances: in
every category, NIEs are involved more fre-
quently than other DCs. Put differently, the di-
vision of labor between unequal partners is more
likely to proceed through other instruments than
NEC.
Selective evidence on business alliances be-
tween firms from India and the US, dating back
to the mid-1980s, confirms the predominance of
market-oriented motives, rather than technology
cooperation (Parvatiyar and Gupta 1994).
The main reason for US firms engaging in
India was to establish a production base in the
large Indian market. Apparently, the choice of
instruments was influenced by government
regulations. Foreign corporations were allowed
to collaborate with Indian businesses in three
basic ways: licensing of technology without
equity participation, joint ventures with foreign
equity capital, and outright purchase of technical
know-how in the form of design and drawings.
Other forms of international cooperation (such
as franchising and production sharing) were
rarely permitted by the Indian government.
Outstanding examples of joint ventures included:
India's Tata Steel and Timken, a US producer of
bearings; India's Modi Group and Xerox in the
area of office automation; and Composite Tools,
a joint venture between a US firm (Precision
Carbide Tools) and an Indian entrepreneur,
which was unique in the sense that the partners
were aiming at exports exclusively. In essence,
all examples represent marketing alliances, with
US product technology and market experience
complementing the relatively cheap manpower
available in India.
Past research on globalization has focused on
large TNCs. Yet there seems to be a role for
smaller firms in international markets, and in
international investment. The opportunities for
smaller firms are simply different from those for
larger TNCs. Because of their limited and spe-
cialized resources, SMEs may be best advised to
compete in niche markets in which margins are
higher, but economies of scale and scope are less
important. Their activities are often less spec-
tacular and, therefore, receive less publicity than
TNC activities.
A recent study on interfirm cooperation stra-
tegies of Canadian SMEs in the Asian-Pacific
region (Dhingra 1991) revealed that these firms
do not behave systematically different than the
average firm from the MERIT data base. First,
it was found that Canadian SMEs display a
relatively high tendency to enter the markets of
developed or newly industrializing countries,
both by equity joint ventures and non-equity
contractual alliances, rather than markets of less
advanced DCs at the Pacific Rim. Strategic alli-
ances of SMEs in high-tech areas (aircraft,
computers, etc.) are more concentrated in indus-
trialized countries; alliances in rather traditional
and mature industries are more localized in DCs.
Second, many of the non-equity alliances were
concluded in capital goods industries; equity
joint ventures prevail in industries like electrical
equipment, electronics, and mining and forestry.
Third, most non-equity alliances of Canadian
SMEs were found to be related to marketing
contracts, which is in accordance with the gen-
eral pattern of Canadian interfirm cooperation
in Asia (Hung 1991, 1992). Fourth, the smaller
the firm the more likely seems to be the recourse
to NEC as compared to FDI.
The selective empirical evidence on NEC does
not allow far-reaching conclusions, particularly
as concerns the involvement of DCs in interfirm
cooperation. The tentative pattern of interna-
tional business alliances emerging from various
sources suggests, however, that the respective
factor endowments of cooperation partners play
a significant role, in addition to government re-
gulations and presumed market inefficiencies. In
high-tech sectors, strategic alliances are mainly
motivated by technology cooperation. Triad-
DC partnerships do not figure prominently here,
as a lower degree of technological capability is
just one of the constituent properties of DCs. Al-
though conclusive cross-country evidence does
not exist, business partnerships with DC firms
seem to be more important when it comes to
standardized production and, especially, to mar-
ket-oriented cooperation. Taken together, tech-
nology appears to be transferred to DCs mainly
by other means than NEC, namely by interna-
tional capital flows.12
II. The Attractiveness of DCs for
Foreign Capital
In the following, the focus is on FDI which, as
mentioned earlier, is the most obvious (and rela-
tively well documented) indication of a country's
locational attractiveness in the era of globaliza-
tion. A first and rather simple test whether DCs
have become more integrated into the world
economy is presented in Table 3.
9 The globali-
zation hypothesis implies that the significance of
trade and capital flows should increase for coun-
tries successfully participating in the more ela-
borate international division of labor. Specifi-
cally, exports should grow faster than produc-
tion (proxied by GNP), and FDI inflows should
grow faster than exports.
1
0 The export-to-GNP
ratio (since 1987) and the FDI-to-export ratio
did indeed increase for the aggregate of all
DCs.
1
1 Booming FDI flows to DCs have caused
a tenfold rise in the latter ratio since 1980, while
the increase of the former has been rather mod-
erate. However, the average development for all




Both indicators show that it is mainly East
Asia which has become more integrated into the
international division of labor. This region
stands out in two respects: (i) it is the only one
for which export growth surpassed production
growth significantly over the whole period under
consideration; (ii) the FDI-to-export ratio re-
veals a record increase (9 percentage points) and
is now higher than in Latin America, which was
the traditionally preferred investment location of
US and European TNCs.
The main reason for this outcome was that
East Asia's integration into the world economy
proceeded along with domestic liberalization.
ASEAN countries, the P.R. of China, South Ko-
rea and Taiwan relaxed FDI restrictions, notably
since the mid-1980s (Chen 1993; ADB 1990).
1
3
At the same time, various East Asian economies
reformed their trade regime (Langhammer 1995;
Riedel 1991): nontariff barriers were replaced
by tariffs, tariff escalation was reduced, and
both tariffs and quantitative import restrictions
were dismantled unilaterally. Import liberaliza-
tion supported specialization according to world
market prices and rendered export expansion
sustainable.
1
4 That is, greater openness was
obviously a precondition for booming FDI.
The integration of other DC groups into the
world economy is less advanced, which may in-
fringe upon their chances to benefit from globa-
lization trends. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the
export-to-GNP ratio stagnated over the whole
period under consideration and the FDI-to-ex-
port ratio remained fairly low. The latter is also
true for South Asia and the Middle East
(including North Africa). It cannot be concluded
from all this, however, that globalization works
against DCs except for East Asia. Developments
over the past 15 years are ambiguous in the case
of Latin America. On the one hand, the export-
to-GNP ratio is still on the decline, which may
indicate that trade policy reforms have remained
insufficient to establish closer trade links with
the rest of the world. On the other hand, the
Table 3 - The Integration of Selected DC Regions into the World Economy, 1980-1994
All DCs
East Asia and Pacific
South Asia
Latin America and Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa






















































































Source: World Bank (1994b).13
earlier erosion of the region's attractiveness for
FDI has been reversed in the early 1990s. This
suggests that locations in Latin America
resumed their role in the sourcing and
marketing strategies of TNCs as a result of
macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization
becoming firmly rooted in major host countries.
The renewed interest of foreign investors in the
region offers favorable prospects for closer
integration into world trade as well, considering
that FDI and trade flows are typically positively
correlated (Nunnenkamp et al. 1994). Likewise,
the soaring FDI-to-export ratio in East Europe
and Central Asia in the early 1990s supports
the proposition that late-comers may join the
ranks and participate in globalization, once
deliberate isolation is replaced by world-
market-oriented economic policies.
East Asia's outstanding position among DCs
in terms of attractiveness for foreign capital is
also reflected by the development of net re-
source inflows and changes in their structure
(Figure 2).
1
5 The share of this region in total
net resource flows to all DCs grew from 15
percent in 1980 to 40 percent in 1994 (World
Bank 1994b). The relative gain in attractiveness
was largely at the expense of Latin America,
whose share in total net resource inflows went
down from one third in 1980 to less than one
fifth in 1994. However, the comparison of these
two years may lead to wrong conclusions with
regard to this region's attractiveness for foreign
capital, unless developments in the interim are
taken into account. Net resource flows to Latin
America dwindled to about US$8 billion in
1989, but recovered quickly thereafter. In
1993/94, they averaged US$53 billion, i.e.,
nearly 180 percent of inflows in 1980.
As concerns the structure of net resource in-
flows, various DC groups have in common that
debt inflows, which had accounted for the bulk
of total inflows in 1980, lost dramatically in im-
portance. If this shift were to be attributed to
the debt crises in Latin America and Africa ex-
clusively, it should have been less pronounced
for regions without serious debt problems such
as East Asia. This is not the case, however. In
both Latin America and East Asia, FDI and
flows of portfolio equity accounted for two
thirds of total net resource inflows in 1994. It
appears, therefore, that structural changes in
the external financing of many DCs are associ-
ated with changes in the behavior of foreign in-
vestors under conditions of globalization and
with a less restrictive attitude of host countries
towards inflows of equity capital. Yet, the situ-
ation of Sub-Saharan Africa indicates that
liberalizing the inflow of equity capital is not
sufficient to induce a shift from debt to equity
capital.
1
6 Rather, the dependence of this region
on foreign grants has gained further momen-
tum. The risk of being delinked from the
globalization strategies of TNCs appears to be
particularly high for those Sub-Saharan African
economies in which investment conditions




As mentioned before, portfolio investment
has accounted for a significant share of total net
resource flows to many DCs since recently.
This applies to the relatively advanced econo-
mies in Latin America and East Asia in the first
place (see also Figure 3).
1
8 The steep increase
in portfolio investment, notably in the early
1990s, was rendered possible by the deregu-
lation of domestic capital markets in many
DCs.
1
9 This allowed provided international in-
vestors, e.g., Western pension funds, to diver-
sify risks and derive profits in newly emerging
capital markets. In contrast to FDI, however,
the expanded engagement of portfolio investors
beyond traditional markets is not directly linked
to the globalization of production. While port-
folio equity flows may be transformed into pro-
ductive investment, they may be of a rather
speculative nature and are easily withdrawn if
higher returns are offered elsewhere or risk per-
ceptions change abruptly (UNCTAD 1995b).
Hence, portfolio investmenttrends to be more
unstable than FDI. Its susceptibility to transient
financial shocks is witnessed by the Mexican
crisis of 1994/95. As a matter of fact, the
phenomenal growth of portfolio equity flows
was sharply interrupted in 1994 (Figure 3).
While the reduction remained marginal in East
Asia (-3 percent), inflows in Latin America
were down to 42 percent of the figures for
1993.14
Figure 2 - Structure of Capital Inflows,










































Debt FDI Portfolio Grants
aPercent of total net resource inflows. Debt refers to net flows to net flows of long-term debt. Figures for 1994 are World Bank
projections. Middle East and North Africa not considered because of negative (net) FDI inflows in 1980.
Source: World Bank (1994b).16
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Yet, the growth of FDI in Latin America con-
tinued in 1994.
2
0 This supports the view that
FDI is less volatile than portfolio investment and
involves a lasting commitment to the recipient
economy (UNCTAD 1995b: 3). Among the
various elements of foreign capital inflows, FDI
therefore provides the best indicator on the posi-
tion of DCs in the globalization strategies of
TNCs.
DCs as a whole have recently made consider-
able progress in getting involved in globalization
through FDI. According to UNCTAD data
(1995a; 1995b), their share in worldwide FDI
inflows averaged 32.3 percent in 1991-1993. In
1993 and 1994, respectively, this share reached
39 percent, which was nearly twice the average
figure for the 1980-1990 period. The result of
the FDI boom was that the ratio of FDI inflows
to gross domestic capital formation increased
from about 2 percent in the mid-1980s to 4.9
percent in 1992 (UNCTAD 1995b: Table 2).
2
117
Again, however, a regionally disaggregated
presentation reveals significant differences be-
tween major DC groups. In West Asia, the ex-
tremely low ratio of FDI inflows to gross do-
mestic capital formation has remained more or
less constant at about 0.5 percent. By contrast,
the ratio has increased by 4 percentage points in
East, South and Southeast Asia since 1985 (to
5.5 percent in 1992).
2
2 Other DC regions, no-
tably Africa and Latin America, range between
these two extremes, in terms of both the level
and the increase in the ratio. This underscores
the above contention that the integration into Ihe




Related to this are significant changes in the
regional distribution of FDI flows to DCs
(Figure 4). East Asia's share has nearly qua-
drupled since 1980. This rise is mainly due to
the P.R. of China's emergence on world capital
markets.
2
4 TNCs have seized the opportunity to
benefit from low-cost sourcing and the huge
market potential, once China's integration into
their globalization strategies was rendered
possible by domestic liberalization. This does
not imply, however, that neighboring DCs have
been negatively affected. Rather, the contrary is
true. FDI flows to East Asian DCs other than
the P.R. of China increased by a factor of 8
from 1980 to 1993. Moreover, Chinese libera-
lization has also encouraged Asian TNCs, to
globalize their production and marketing. As a
matter of fact, the four Asian NIEs (Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) accounted
for more than three quarters of FDI stocks in the
P.R. of China by mid-1993 (UNCTAD 1995a:
Table 4; see also below).
East Europe and Central Asia is the second
region that has increased its share in total FDI
flows. This recent development is obviously re-
lated to the progress achieved in economic trans-
formation, notably in transition economies in
East Central Europe. Latin America appears to
be the main loser.
However, the regional share in total FDI
flows tends to obscure factors relevant for as-
sessing the position of Latin American econo-
mies in the context of globalization. First, the
earlier stagnation of FDI inflows came to an end
in the late 1980s. The projected figure of US$19
billion for 1994 exceeded the inflows in 1987 by
a factor of 3.3 (World Bank 1994b). Second,
several DCs in this region were among the best
performers when FDI inflows in 1993 are com-
pared to 1984.
2
5 The top five DCs in terms of
this ratio include Argentina, Mexico and Chile
(as well as the P.R. of China and Morocco).
Particularly the favorable position of Argentina
and Mexico indicates that attractiveness for FDI
may be regained in the aftermath of major eco-
nomic crises, once consistent domestic policy re-
forms (comprising macroeconomic stabilization
and structural adjustment) are implemented. The
counterfactual is provided by a country such as
Brazil: this less reform-minded country lost its
top position with regard to FDI inflows in 1984,




Overall, the evidence for major DC recipients
of FDI in 1984 puts into perspective the wide-
spread belief that only few DCs may benefit
from globalization. Underlying this belief is the
observation that between two thirds and three
fourths of total FDI flows to DCs have consis-
tently been absorbed by the ten largest host
economies (see, e.g., UNCTAD 1995: 9). Fre-
quently it is not taken into account, however,
that the country composition of the group of best
performers changes over time. The top ten of
1984 experienced a considerable decline in their
share in total FDI flows until 1993 (from 77.2 to
62.6 percent),
2
7 since new investment locations
were becoming more attractive. The notion of
persistently high concentration of FDI in DCs
thus tends to underrate the chance of newcomers
to enhance their locational attractiveness for
foreign investors.
The chance of newcomers to participate in
globalization has been further improved since
recently. Some relatively advanced DCs, which
had originally been only recipients of FDI, have
become increasingly involved in outward FDI.
2
8
Their overall contribution to worldwide FDI out-
flows is still fairly low (Table 4). However, they
are playing an important role as foreign in-
vestors in specific recipient countries, notably in
less advanced neighboring economies. The so-
called flying-geese pattern of East and Southeastoo

































East Asia and Pacific (EA) I Jtin America and Caribbean (LA) South Asia (SA)
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Not specified (NS)
East Europe and Central
Asia (EE)
Percentage share in FDI flows to DCs other than in the Middle East and North Africa; this region is excluded because of significantly negative (net) FDI flows in 1980. Data on Hong Kong, Singapore
and Taiwan are not reported in the source. Figures for 1994 are World Bank projections.
Source: World Bank (1994b).19
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aSome DCs which are well-known for investing abroad do not report offi-
cial statistics on FDI outflows. India, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Malaysia
are cases in point. Moreover, the source does not provide data on Taiwan.
Hence, the share of DCs in worldwide FDI outflows and Asia's share in all
DCs' FDI outflows are likely to be underestimated. Figures for 1993 are
not fully comparable with previous figures due to incomplete data (figures
for the P.R. of China and Thailand, for example, are not available). —
°South Africa excluded.
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook
(various issues).
Asian FDI is the most relevant case in point. In
addition to their strong engagement in the P.R.
of China, Asian NIEs (among which Hong Kong
was the frontrunner) have invested significantly
in medium-income ASEAN countries.
2
9 At the
same time, the latter have undertaken invest-
ments in lower-income countries such as the
P.R. of China and Vietnam.
The Asian pattern is basically driven by
industrial restructuring going along with rising
per capita income and wages.
3
0 The relatively
advanced source countries are shifting towards
more sophisticated lines of production, while
relocating labor-intensive activities to lower-
income economies. Similar to Japanese FDI in
Asia, most of the NIEs' engagement is export-
oriented. FDI thus facilitates moving up the
ladder of comparative advantage in the source
countries and, at the same time, offers opportu-
nities for catching-up in the recipient countries.
As a result, both country groups are better pre-
pared to benefit from the worldwide trend
towards globalized production.
As compared with Asia, intraregional net-
working appears to be less advanced in Latin
America.
3
1 In 1992, reported FDI flows between
Latin American economies were largely restric-
ted to Brazilian and Chilean engagements in
Argentina. Yet, the higher share of this region in
total FDI outflows from DCs in 1993 (Table 4)
suggests that Latin America, too, may enhance
its integration into the international division of
labor by strengthening investment linkages.
D. Selected Case Studies
For several reasons, the globalization of produc-
tion and its implications for DCs are nicely to
differ between various manufacturing industries.
First, the degree to which production can be
globalized depends on industry-specific charac-
teristics. Globalization should be most advanced
in industries which lend themselves easily for
fragmentation of production processes, or for
which production in the various final markets is
essential for successful marketing. Globalization
may be less advanced in industries characterized
by closely intertwined stages of the production
process (e.g., feedbacks from production to re-
search and development) and large economies of
scale. Second, the countries benefiting from glo-
balization may vary from industry to industry.
Notably the implications for DCs will depend on
whether their endowment with production fac-
tors conforms with the specific demands of a
particular industry. Third, the mode of globali-
zation is unlikely to be the same across indus-
tries. If internalization incentives are strong, FDI
will be the preferred means. NEC may prevail in
more standardized manufacturing activities (see
Chapter B).
The subsequent sector studies will capture
such differences at least tentatively:
- Textiles and clothing provide an example for
a highly competitive and labor-intensive in-
dustry, in which non-equity forms of globali-
zation have a long tradition.20
- Chemicals stand for a physical-capital-inten-
sive industry that has been among the front-
runners of globalization by means of FDI.
- The production of automobiles represents a
technologically more advanced and human-
capital-intensive sector, in which new com-
petitors from DCs have emerged recently.
The sector studies present some indications on
the overall degree of globalization achieved, and
then proceed to analyzing the implications for
DCs. The industry-specific position of DCs is
assessed by raising the following questions.
First, has production been shifted towards DCs
and which regions have benefited from relo-
cation? Second, to which extent have DCs pene-
trated developed country markets and from
where have new competitive world market sup-
pliers emerged? Third, to which extent have FDI
and other means of production sharing been used
to integrate DCs into globalization strategies?
Definite answers to these questions are some-
times difficult to achieve because of data con-
straints, however. For example, the statistical
base is deficient as concerns industry-specific
FDI flows to various DC groups. Based on
various sources, a general pattern can neverthe-
less be identified.
I. Textiles and Clothing
Among the three sectors under consideration,
textiles and clothing appear to be best suited for
globalization, and DCs are most likely to bene-
fit. Labor intensity is relatively high, which ex-
plains why many DCs started industrialization in
this sector. Moreover, different stages of the
production process have their specific technolo-
gical and organizational characteristics. This en-
courages a division of labor by means of in-
ternational fragmentation of production.
3
2 Yet,
globalization may have been retarded because
the sector has been subject to intense political
interference since decades, notably under the
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA).
Indications are that policy interventions by
developed countries did not halt globalization:
- World exports of textiles and clothing (SITC
categories 65 and 84) grew by a factor of 2.7
between 1980 and 1992. This was significantly




- The textile, clothing and footwear industry be-
longs to the top group of OECD industries with
regard to international sourcing (OECD 1994a:
18, Table 18). The ratio of imported to domestic
sourcing of inputs in this industry reveals a
rising trend for all major industrialized countries
since the early 1970s.
- In textiles and clothing, FDI has traditionally
played a minor role, as compared to other manu-
facturing sectors. However, the sector's share in
total manufacturing FDI outflows of France,
Japan and the US increased from 1.1 percent in
1983-1985 to 2.9 percent in 1990-1992 (OECD
1994b).
3
4 At the same time, the ratio of FDI
outflows to exports of textiles and clothing of
these countries went up from 0.5 to 3 percent.
3
5
FDI thus expanded more rapidly than exports,
which is consistent with the globalization hypo-
thesis. Moreover, as will be shown below, NEC
figures prominently in textiles and clothing.
In contrast to automobile and chemical pro-
duction, textiles and clothing are among the geo-
graphically most dispersed manufacturing indus-
tries. Taken together, DCs accounted for 35 per-
cent of world textile production (ISIC 321) and
26.4 percent of world clothing production (ISIC
322) in 1993.
3
6 DCs expanded their share in
world production of both industries by more
than 8 percentage points after 1984 (Figure 5).
Many DCs, though not all, participated in this
favorable development. Asian DCs contributed
more than 70 percent to all DCs' textile and
clothing production. Moreover, the increase of
production shares was most impressive for this
region. The group of East and Southeast Asian
economies was particularly successful in gaining
production shares. However, all other country
groups within the Asian region, too, attracted
higher shares in world production of textiles and
clothing.
The picture is more ambiguous elsewhere.
Among the regions considered in Figure 5, dra-
matically declining production shares are repor-Figure 5 — Share of DCs in World Production of Textiles and Clothing,
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ted for Eastern Europe only. This decline is re-
stricted to the recent past and can be attributed
to the general output fall after the collapse of the
socialist regime. Modestly declining production
shares are shown for Latin America. While
much of this decline was concentrated on the
1980s, the downward trend has still continued in
recent years. This may suggest that economic
policy reforms pay off with a considerable time
lag only if the credibility of governments is seri-
ously eroded because of previous policy failures.
In this respect, an encouraging sign may be that
Latin America returned to positive growth of
production of textiles and clothing in the early
1990s (unpublished UNIDO data base). African
DCs increased their production shares slightly.
Most notably, Sub-Saharan Africa reported a
higher production growth in clothing than all
DCs taken together in 1983-1993 (6.3 versus
4.4 percent). Nevertheless, the overall contribu-
tion of African DCs to world production of tex-
tiles and clothing remained marginal.
International trade patterns strongly support
that DCs benefited from globalized production
of textiles and clothing. Indices of export specia-
lization reveal that DCs have achieved interna-
tional competitiveness in both textiles and cloth-
ing. A frequently used index relates the share of
textiles and clothing in total DC exports to the
share of world exports of these items in total
world exports (see, e.g., OECD 1994a: 19). An
index higher than 1 indicates a favorable perfor-
mance of DC exporters of textiles and clothing
by world standards. As a matter of fact, their
index for textiles (SITC 65) rose from 0.94 in
1980 to 1.76 in 1992; for clothing (SITC 84), it
increased from 1.37 to 2.36.
3
7 The higher level
and the stronger (absolute) increase of the index
for clothing reveals that many DCs have exploi-
ted their comparative advantage in this parti-
cularly labor-intensive segment. The calculated
index figures even tend to understate the interna-
tional competitiveness of DCs, because in con-
trast to OECD competitors, DC exporters of
textiles and clothing were subject to restrictive
MFA regulations.
Table 5 provides more detailed insights on
which of the non-OECD exporters of textiles
and clothing have benefited from globalization.
The criterion is whether and to which extent they
succeeded to penetrate OECD markets for tex-
tiles and clothing.
3
8 In less labor-intensive pro-
duction of textiles, the Far East alone (notably
the P.R. of China, South Asia and ASEAN
countries) accounted for the increase of the mar-
ket share of non-OECD suppliers by 3 percent-
age points in 1983-1992. Given the different
production characteristics in the two segments of
the sector under consideration, it is not surpris-
ing that both the level and increase of the non-
OECD market share is higher for clothing.
Moreover, improved competitiveness is not re-
stricted to one particular region in this case.
Though from fairly low base levels, the market
shares of Africa and Latin America nearly dou-
bled. All major suppliers from these regions par-
ticipated in this development.
3
9 This is in con-
trast to the Far East, for which the extremely
high but stagnating market share obscures re-
markable changes within the region.
Table 5 - Share of Non-OECD Origins in OECD Imports
of Textiles and Clothing,


































































































aCountries are selected according to their significance as exporters within
the region under consideration; also included are countries or which
changes in market shares are notable. — °Hong Kong, Singapore, South
Korea and Taiwan.
Source: OECD Foreign Trade by Commodities, Series C
(various issues).
The sharply declining share of OECD imports
of clothing from Asian NIEs may be partly due
to discrimination within the MFA framework.
However, the major reason seems to be that23
these relatively advanced economies restructured
their manufacturing sectors towards more so-
phisticated lines of production. Parallel to this
shift in Asian NIEs, neighboring countries with
lower per capita income emerged as most com-
petitive suppliers of clothing on OECD markets.
While this applies to the P.R. of China in the
first place, South Asian and ASEAN exporters,
too, reported rapidly rising market shares.
4
0
Successful restructuring within Asia is not
only reflected by intraregional shifts in trade.
What has been called the flying-geese pattern is
also observable with regard to FDI in textiles




- Hong Kong was the top supplier of clothing on
OECD markets in 1983, and 11-12 percent of
its inward FDI stock was still in textiles and
clothing at that time. The city state then became
the frontrunner in relocating production to
neighboring lower-income DCs.
4
2 This move re-
ceived another push once the P.R. of China
opened up to FDI (see also ADB 1990: 41).
- In 1992, textiles and clothing accounted for
2.4 percent of total FDI inflows into Taiwanese
manufacturing, while the sector's share in FDI
outflows of Taiwanese manufacturing was 21.6
percent. By contrast, (lower-income) Thailand
did not report FDI outflows in textiles and cloth-
ing to any significant extent, whereas the sec-
tor's contribution to FDI inflows in manufac-
turing was still relatively high.
- In ASEAN countries, the earlier focus of FDI
inflows on resource processing was subse-
quently replaced by a shift towards labor-in-
tensive manufacturing. FDI in textiles and cloth-
ing figured prominently in this respect, and
much of it originated from Asian NIEs.
- South Asia's involvement in'intra-Asian net-
working remained relatively weak (Agarwal et
al. 1995). The case of India suggests that this is
at least partly due to restrictions imposed on
FDI in labor-intensive manufacturing such as
textiles and clothing. Lall (1993: 108f.), for
example, argues that the upgrading of Indian
clothing exports was retarded in this way. This
may explain why India's share in OECD
imports of clothing increased only modestly by
the standards of newly emerging Asian com-
petitors (Table 5).
As mentioned before, outward FDI by OECD
countries is small in textiles and clothing, rela-
tive to FDI in the manufacturing sector as a
whole. Among major investor countries, the sec-
tor's share was highest in overseas FDI stocks
held by Japan (4.8 percent of FDI stocks in ma-
nufacturing in 1992) (OECD 1994b). About two
thirds of Japan's engagement was in Asian DCs
(OECD 1994a: 21). Moreover, mainly Asian
neighbors benefited from subcontracting with
Japanese producers and trading companies (sogo
shosha) (Dicken 1992; Oman 1989).
Yet, other DC regions became integrated into
globalization strategies of TNCs as well. The
Caribbean, Mexican and Colombian clothing in-
dustries attracted FDI from the US (OECD
1994a: 22). Likewise, Mediterranean countries
(e.g., Morocco and Tunisia) were the target of
FDI from the EU. More importantly, though, the
degree to which DCs benefited from globaliza-
tion of US and EU producers would be seriously
understated if non-equity forms of production
sharing were ignored (Nunnenkamp et al. 1994:
75f.). Contractual arrangements have been wide-
ly used for the production and delivery of
finished products by independent DC suppliers.
Major partners of EU producers include compa-
nies in Turkey, Hong Kong and, increasingly,
the P.R. of China. Furthermore, subcontracting
has played a significant role in offshore process-
ing of clothing. The ensuing fragmentation of
EU production has basically followed the pattern
established by preferential trade arrangements.
Accordingly, Mediterranean countries and the




transformation proceeding, Central and Eastern




All in all, DCs have participated successfully
in globalized production of textiles and clothing,
even though they were subject to restrictive
MFA regulations. In all probability, their inte-
gration into the worldwide division of labor will
be further enhanced as it has been agreed in the24
Uruguay Round to re-integrate MFA trade into
the GATT/WTO framework.
II. Chemicals
The chemical industry has been a frontrunner
with regard to globalization. For major investor
countries, it accounts for a substantial share of
total overseas FDI stocks in manufacturing.
4
5
Also in terms of FDI outflows, globalization
was more advanced than in the two other sectors
analyzed in this study. FDI outflows in chemi-
cals averaged 22 percent of outflows in all man-
ufacturing industries by France, Germany, Ja-
pan, the UK and the US in 1990-1992 (OECD
1994b). The FDI-to-export ratio for the same
group of countries and time period of about 7
percent exceeded the corresponding ratio for
both textiles/clothing and motor vehicles by far.
Furthermore, Figure 6 reveals that chemicals
conform perfectly to the predicted pattern of
globalization, i.e., export growth surpassing pro-
duction growth, and FDI growing even faster
than exports.
Globalization in this physical-capital-inten-
sive industry largely depends on the strategies of
ten huge TNCs based in OECD countries. They
accounted for 20 percent of world sales in 1988
(OECD 1992: 66). Recent merger and acquisi-
tion activities have probably added to concen-
tration (Nunnenkamp et al. 1994: 67, Table A6).
Nearly four fifths of worldwide turnover in
chemicals were accounted for by OECD coun-
tries in 1993 (Verband der Chemischen Industrie
1994: 105). All this seems to suggest that
globalization in the chemical industry is largely
restricted to industrialized economies.
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aBased on data for EU countries, the US and Japan. FDI data are incomplete for the EU (notably Germany is not included).
Production refers to turnover, exports to SITC 5.
Source: OECD (1994b), UN (1994b), Verband der Chemischen Industrie (1994).25
However, non-OECD producers got increas-
ingly involved in the chemical industry. The
share of all DCs in world production ranged be-
tween 13 percent for plastic products and 18
percent for industrial chemicals in 1993 (Table
6). In the light of different factor intensities it is
not surprising that the DC share remained lower
in chemicals than in textiles and clothing. Never-
theless, both sectors have several things in com-
mon as concerns the role of DCs in globalized
production. First of all, chemical production ex-
panded overproportionally in DCs. The increase
of the share of all DCs in world production was
most pronounced for industrial chemicals.
4
6
Second, chemical production by DCs became in-
creasingly concentrated on the Asian region. In
the case of industrial chemicals, Asian DCs as a
whole nearly doubled their share in world pro-
duction, and their contribution to total DC pro-
duction rose from 44 percent in 1984 to 70 per-
cent in 1993. The group of East and Southeast
Asian economies accounted for most of the in-
crease of chemical production within Asia.
Again, however, other Asian DCs became more
important production locations as well. This re-
fers in particular to (formerly) centrally planned
economies in this region, whereas Western Asia
benefited from shifts in worldwide production
only in the case of industrial chemicals.
Third, Latin America hosted a larger share of
worldwide production of industrial and other
Table 6 - Share of DCs in World Production of Chemi-
cals,





















































aProduction refers to deflated value added, converted to




























— °Including the former
Source: UNIDO data base.
chemicals than Asian DCs in 1984. As a pro-
duction location for industrial chemicals, Latin
America lost considerably in importance during
the second half of the 1980s; the declining trend
of the region's production share in this segment
of the chemical industry was stopped only re-
cently. Diverging developments occurred in
other segments: Latin America's high share in
world production of other chemicals remained
virtually unchanged, whereas its role in the pro-
duction of plastics continued to decline until
1993. Finally, chemical production in African
DCs remained marginal as compared with all
other DC regions. This was to be expected, con-
sidering the rather unfavorable position of Afri-
can DCs even in industries which are better suit-
ed to their factor endowments than chemicals.
The world market performance of DCs in the
chemical industry (SITC 5) underlines major
findings revealed by production trends and pro-
vides some additional insights on the competitive
position of these countries. The export special-
ization index (introduced in the previous section)
reveals that DCs as a whole have improved their
international competitiveness in chemicals. The
share of SITC 5 in their total exports, relative to
the share of world chemical exports in world to-
tal exports, more than doubled from an index
figure of 0.25 in 1980 to 0.53 in 1992.
4
7 How-
ever, the index is still substantially below 1, in-
dicating that DCs did not meet the world stan-
dard with regard to the weight of chemicals in
overall trade. Accordingly, the share of all non-
OECD suppliers in chemical imports of OECD
countries is only a fraction of their import share
in textiles and clothing (Tables 7 and 5). This is
due to different factor intensities prevailing in
these two sectors.
Against this background, it is not surprising
that the number of DCs reporting rising shares
in OECD imports of SITC 5 is smaller, notably
as compared with clothing. More interestingly,
though, the country composition of the group of
most successful exporters differs between che-
micals and clothing. In chemicals, mainly Asian
NIEs made progress in penetrating OECD mar-
kets, i.e., exactly those economies reporting de-
clining market shares in clothing. This supports
the proposition that various DC groups at diffe-26
rent stages of economic development may bene-
fit from globalization. The more advanced divi-
sion of labor at a worldwide scale helped the
relatively advanced DCs to upgrade their export
structure. This in turn provided better chances
for less advanced newcomers to enter world
markets for more traditional, labor-intensive
products, in which the frontrunners with regard
to world market orientation were losing their
comparative advantage.
Furthermore, Table 7 points to a highly di-
verse picture in different branches of the chemi-
cal sector:
- The share of non-OECD suppliers in OECD
imports is lowest for Pharmaceuticals. It is only
in this branch that even Asian NIEs did not gain
market shares in 1983-1992. Arguably, the
pharmaceutical industry is most difficult for
DCs to enter: It is highly concentrated and be-
longs to the most R&D-intensive manufacturing
activities; product innovation is a crucially im-
portant competitive parameter (OECD 1992:
75ff.).
- For dyeing and related materials (SITC 53)
and plastics (SITC 57 + 58), market shares of
non-OECD suppliers are not much higher. In
contrast to Pharmaceuticals, however, OECD
imports from non-OECD origins have increased
overproportionally. With few exceptions (notab-
ly Argentina), this applies to all individual DCs
considered in Table 7. Cases of considerable
progress in penetrating OECD markets are
largely the Middle and Far East; they include
Asian NIEs and, in SITC 53, the P.R. of China
and India.
- More than half of worldwide chemical pro-
duction is accounted for by industrial chemicals,
among which the relation between organic and
inorganic chemicals is roughly 2 to 1 (OECD
1992: 65). For non-OECD sources as a whole,
the increase of the market share for organic che-
micals contrasts sharply with the decline (from a
fairly high level) for inorganic chemicals. The
latter is mainly due to the unfavorable perfor-
mance of Africa.
4
8 DCs in other regions gained
market shares (except Mexico), with the P.R. of
Table 7 - Share of Non-OECD Origins in OECD Imports of Chemicals,
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. — "Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and TaiwarI.
Source: OECD Foreign Trade by Commodities, Series C (various issues).27
China as the best performer by far. The same is
true for organic chemicals, which are generally
based on petroleum and natural gas; the notable
exception in this branch is Brazil, whereas Asian
NIEs performed best.
All in all, the OECD's import structure con-
firms that progress in entering world chemical
markets was concentrated on Far Eastern econo-
mies. This development was not restricted to
Asian NIEs, however, but included lower-in-
come countries such as the P.R. of China and
India in different segments of the chemical sec-
tor.
OECD-based TNCs are estimated to account
for about a quarter of DC production of chemi-
cals (OECD 1992: 68). This indicates already
that FDI has supported the integration of emerg-
ing chemical producers into the international
division of labor. The distribution of overseas
FDI stocks held by the chemical industry of ma-
jor investor countries reveals some interesting
features in this respect (Table 8). The coun-
terpart to Africa's poor world market perfor-
mance was its failure to attract FDI to any signi-
ficant extent. Latin American DCs (especially
Brazil and Mexico) hosted more than 70 percent
of German and US FDI in the chemical sector of
non-OECD countries in the early 1990s. Asian
DCs were largely ignored by German inves-
tors.
4
9 Among Asian DCs, which hosted about
one third of US FDI stocks, the group of four
NIEs received the greatest attention of US inves-
tors. By contrast, Indonesia was the most impor-
tant recipient of Japanese FDI. Generally it
appears that the integration of Asian DCs into
world chemical markets was fostered by reloca-
tion of Japanese production in the first place (see
also OECD 1992: 72).
5
0 Asia's share in total
chemical FDI stocks of Japan was five times as
large as for US FDI (and exceeded the corres-
ponding share in German FDI by a factor of 16).
The role of FDI in stimulating chemical pro-
duction in DCs is underscored by the promi-
nence of this sector in total FDI inflows of major
host DCs in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
5
1
For four out of seven host countries (Argentina,
Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan), the chemi-
cal industry accounted for 23-26 percent of total
Table 8 - FDI Stocks in Chemicals Held by Germany,
Japan and the US in DCs (percent of total FDI stocks in









































































































regions. Central and Eastern
Europe includes formerly centrally planned economies in Asia (notably the
P.R. of China). Total represents the sum of all DCs, as given in the source,
OPEC and Central and Eastern Europe. — 'K5PEC countries are included
in the respective regions. Middle East is not included in Asian DCs. Total:
sum of African DCs, Latin America, Asian DCs and Middle East. —
COPEC countries are included in the respective regions. Asian DCs: Asia
and Pacific, as given in the source, minus Australia, Japan and New Zea-
land. Total: sum of Latin America, Asian
Europe.
DCs and Central and Eastern
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1994), Ministry of
Finance (1993), US Department of Commerce (1994).
FDI inflows in manufacturing. Among manufac-
turing industries, chemicals ranked first (South
Korea) or second, only surpassed by motor vehi-
cles in Argentina and Mexico, and by electric
and electronic equipment in Taiwan. The contri-
bution of chemicals to overall FDI inflows in
manufacturing ranged between 10-14 percent in
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Still, it rank-
ed second (behind electric and electronic equip-
ment) in the latter two countries.
In addition to FDI, international linkages have
been established through NEC.
5
2 In a number of
cases, TNCs have participated in establishing
petrochemical plants in DCs through technical
cooperation agreements, turnkey projects, man-
agement and marketing contracts, and licensing.
Examples include: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico28
in Latin America, and India, the P.R. of China,
South Korea, Taiwan and ASEAN countries in
the Far East (Ward 1992: 7; Oman 1989). Phar-
maceuticals and other chemicals accounted for
nearly one third of all non-equity investments in
Bangladesh during the 1980s (Reza 1992).
Franchising has increasingly been used as a flex-
ible instrument of globalization in countries
where business risks and bureaucratic hurdles
are still high (e.g., in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope).
In summary, globalization in the chemical in-
dustry has gone beyond fierce competition
among OECD suppliers since recently. The
Triad of the EU, Japan and the US will continue
to dominate this sector for the time being. How-
ever, the evidence presented above supports ear-
lier forecasts that the Asian-Pacific region has
the best chances to expand production and ex-
ports of chemicals (UNIDO 1990: 187). High
growth projections for Asian chemical markets
are fuelling FDI inflows into this region. The in-
tegration of newly emerging producers of chemi-
cals into the international division of labor may
gain further momentum once uncertainty of for-
eign investors due to insufficient protection of
intellectual property rights is reduced.
5
3 The re-
cent agreement on trade-related intellectual pro-
perty rights (TRIPs) during the Uruguay Round
represents a major step in this direction.
III. Motor Vehicles
Among manufacturing industries, motor vehicles
rank third in terms of FDI stocks held abroad by
the US and Germany in 1992 (OECD 1994b).
5
4
FDI outflows originating from these two coun-
tries averaged 3.5 percent of motor vehicle ex-
ports in 1990-1992.
5
5 This ratio was lower than
in chemicals, but substantially above the FDI-to-
export ratio in the textile and clothing industries
of the US and Germany. Furthermore, the US
ratio increased from 2.2 percent in 1983-1985
to 5.2 percent in 1990-1992 (German data are
not available). All this suggests that globaliza-
tion prevails in the manufacturing of motor ve-
hicles as well.
Yet, among the three sectors analyzed in this
study, it may be most difficult for DCs to par-
ticipate in globalized production of motor vehi-
cles. This sector applies relatively advanced
technologies and is, thus, fairly demanding in
terms of human skills. As a matter of fact, few
DCs have emerged so far as important produc-
ers of motor vehicles (Table 9).
5
6 Their share in
worldwide production has increased significant-
ly, however. Within a decade, production soared
nearly eightfold in South Korea and surpassed 2
million units in 1993. In the P.R. of China and
Mexico, production expanded by a factor of 3.7
and 3.0, respectively. As a result, earlier projec-
tions on production shares of non-OECD sup-
pliers were considerably exceeded.
5
7 The dis-
crepancy between actual and hypothesized pro-
duction shares is likely to increase further. The
group of newly emerging suppliers of motor
vehicles will be enlarged, as soon as Western
engagements in the automobile sectors of transi-
tion economies in Central Europe result in in-
creased production in this region.
The regional distribution of production of au-
toparts is more difficult to assess, because com-
Table 9 - Production of Motor Vehicles by Major Non-
OECD Suppliers, 1984 and 1993 (percent of worldwide
production)























































Source: VDA (various issues).29
parable statistics are largely lacking. Until the
late 1980s, parts production was concentrated
on OECD countries at least as strongly as auto-
mobile production. According to estimates by
the OECD (1992: 35), it was only South Korea
and Taiwan which recorded a noteworthy — and
rising — production of autoparts. Selected em-
pirical evidence from various sources suggests,
however, that non-OECD suppliers have in-
creased their share in parts production recently:
First, major DC producers of motor vehicles
have achieved a very high local parts content
(OECD 1992: 52f.). In South Korea, nearly 90
percent of automotive inputs used by national
assemblers were supplied by domestic firms.
Local content is well over 80 percent in Brazil
and Argentina, and in the range of 60-70 per-
cent in Mexico. Taiwan attempted to develop a
largely self-sufficient automobile industry by the
1990s, while ASEAN countries promoted parts
production at the regional level.
5
8 Second, UN
data suggest that more than 17 percent of
worldwide production of motor vehicle engines
(ISIC code 3843-04A) originated from Mexico
and South Korea in 1992; five years earlier, the
share of these two countries had been 11.3 per-
cent (UN 1994a: 824).
5
9 Third, some DCs have
attracted offshore autoparts production by
OECD firms. Significant US and Japanese in-
vestment in Mexico's duty-free zones is a case
in point (OECD 1992: 53). Likewise, US car
manufacturers operating in Brazil export parts
back to the US. Brazil's integration into the glo-
balization strategies of automobile TNCs is re-
flected by a particularly high share of exports of
automotive inputs (including chassis, bodies,
parts and accessories) in its total automotive ex-
ports (38 percent in 1992) (VDA 1994: 333).
6
0
Also the rather indigenous Korean industry has
started supplying autoparts to foreign car manu-
facturers (about 10 percent of its total autoparts
production), mostly to Japan.
6
1
The regional structure of OECD imports of
road vehicles (SITC 78)
6
2 supports major find-
ings from the distribution of worldwide produc-
tion (Table 10). OECD countries continued to
dominate, and non-OECD competitors were still
few. Yet, some of the newly emerging suppliers
made considerable progress in penetrating
Table 10 - Share of Non-OECD Origins in OECD Im-
ports of Road Vehicles (SITC 78),

























Countries are selected according to their significance
as exporters within the region under consideration; also
included are countries for which changes in market
shares are notable. — ^Including South Africa, which
almost exclusively accounts for African exports of
SITC 78.
Source: OECD Foreign Trade by Commodities (various
issues).
OECD markets. This applies to Mexico, South
Korea and Taiwan in the first place. The parallel
increase of domestic production and export mar-
ket shares (except for Brazil) indicates that the
motor vehicle industry of some relatively ad-
vanced DCs has become competitive by world
market standards.
In most instances, this development was
helped by drawing on Western skills and tech-
nology. FDI played the dominant role in Latin
America's motor vehicle industry. This sector
accounted for 27 percent of Mexico's FDI in-
flows in manufacturing in 1988-1992 (OECD
1994b: 161). The respective share amounted to
39 percent in Argentina (1990-1992), and 17
percent in Brazil (1983-1987) (OECD
1994c).
6
3 Latin America hosted nearly all Ger-
man FDI stocks in the motor vehicle industry of
DCs (DM 4.5 billion in 1992) (Deutsche Bun-
desbank 1994).
6
4 Also US FDI in the motor
vehicle industry of DCs was heavily concentra-
ted on this region (US Department of Commerce
1994: 137). The major motive underlying Ger-
man and US investment was to penetrate large
— and protected — markets of Latin American
economies. Nevertheless, operations in Brazil30
and Mexico were increasingly integrated into the
global sourcing strategies of TNCs (notably of
US companies).
As compared with Latin America, FDI played
a less important role in the motor vehicle indus-
tries of Asian countries.
6
5 In South Korea, the
sector's share in total FDI inflows in manufac-
turing amounted to 14 percent in 1989-1991
(OECD 1994c: 13). Nonetheless, the develop-
ment of local automobile production has been
supported considerably by establishing links
with leading Western companies. Government
policies in Asian DCs have gradually shifted
from high protection of domestic automobile
producers to a greater degree of global interac-
tion, in order to encourage technology transfers
from OECD countries (OECD 1992: 52f.):
- ASEAN countries concluded an agreement
with Mitsubishi to help promoting the
ASEAN car project.
- The Korean autoparts industry was built on
the basis of licensing and other interfirm ar-




- Recently, major EU automobile producers,
too, entered into cooperation agreements and
joint ventures with minor equity stakes in
South Korea, Taiwan, India and, most nota-
bly, in the P.R. of China.
6
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It may be difficult to predict the future shape
of the world's motor vehicle industry, which will
depend on the strategies of major OECD firms
in the first place. Technological and organiza-
tional innovations, including lean production,
flexible workshops and just-in-time delivery,
may result in closer networking between input
suppliers, car assemblers and customers at the
regional level. If so, worldwide sourcing and ex-
port-oriented offshore production would become
less important in determining international com-
petitiveness of car manufacturers (Oman 1994).
In any case, however, some new competitors
from relatively advanced countries in the Far
East, Latin America and Central Europe are
well prepared to participate successfully in the
future development of worldwide production of
motor vehicles. First attempts to establish pro-
duction facilities in the OECD, such as the as-
sembly plant for the Korean car manufacturer
Hyundai in Canada, are a clear indication to this
effect.
Finally, the experience of Brazil and Mexico
suggests that the chances of new competitors to
benefit from globalization in this relatively so-
phisticated industry critically depend on domes-
tic economic policies and the ensuing local in-
vestment climate. Probably, it is not by pure
coincidence that Mexico has succeeded to im-
prove both its attractiveness for FDI and its
competitive position on automotive OECD mar-
kets, relative to Brazil. Rather, these develop-
ments seem to be related to comprehensive re-
form efforts in Mexico, and at best partial at-
tempts at macroeconomic stabilization and
structural adjustment in Brazil. This proposition
is further elaborated in the next chapter.
E. The Future Position of DCs in Globalized Production
The previous chapters have demonstrated the
different degree to which various DCs are parti-
cipating in the globalization of production and
markets. What makes up for these differences,
and what are the determinants of becoming an
attractive location for risk capital? Once the de-
terminants are understood, it will be possible to
draw some policy conclusions for those DCs
that want to follow the way which was led by
many Asian DCs, especially during the past
decade.
I. The Impact of Domestic Economic
Policies
The major factors shaping the future position of
DCs in globalized production concern the stance31
of domestic economic policies with respect to
macroeconomic stability, investment, and human
capital formation. Figure 7 presents selected evi-
dence as to why East Asia has been more suc-
cessful than other groups of DCs
6
8 in attracting
FDI and other forms of international business
cooperation, and why it has become the new
powerhouse of the world economy. The first in-
dicator of a sound business environment is
macroeconomic stability, namely the absence of
high and volatile rates of inflation. High rates of
inflation render it difficult for consumers and
producers to identify changes in relative prices.
The reduced informational content of observed
price changes results in higher investment risks,
and in a misallocation of resources. Inflation
safe, though less productive investments will be
preferred. Unexpected inflation may have a
positive output effect in the short run by reduc-
ing real wages. However, money illusion is un-
likely to prevail for long. Future wage demands
will take into account the expected rate of infla-
tion. Eventually, this process may end up in hy-
perinflation, output decline, soaring unemploy-
ment, and political chaos. Latin America has
performed most unfavorably in this respect in
the past, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa and
Central Europe. In the latter, high rates of infla-
tion largely reflect soft budget constraints of
state-owned enterprises which have relied on
government support for sustaining production
and employment.
Persistent inflation is generally home-made,
budget deficits of the government being the main
reason. This is most obvious when deficits are
financed by printing money. Alternatively, the
higher the budget deficit, the higher have to be
the taxes that producers and consumers have to
pay. High business taxes impair the incentive to
invest and, thereby, reduce productivity growth;
high income taxes impair the incentive to work
(except for work in the underground economy),
and, thereby, further enforce the pressure to in-
crease taxes. It follows that countries with large
budget deficits and high rates of inflation are
relatively unattractive locations for international
investors, and cannot be expected to experience
strong economic growth in the long run.















































East Asia: P.R. of China, Indonesia, South Korea, Phil-
ippines, Thailand; South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Nepal,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka; Latin America: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico; Sub-Saharan Africa: Camer-
oon, C6te d'lvoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania; Central
Europe: Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania.
Population weighted averages. — "Annual average,
1980-1992. —
 cIn percent of GDP, average for 1980-
1992, in constant international prices. — ^Excluding
Lithuania. —
 eAverage years of schooling of the working
age population, 1985. — ^Excluding P.R. of China. —
SExcluding Cote d'lvoire.
Source: Barro and Lee (1993), Heston et al. (1994),
World Bank (1994c).32
Macroeconomic stability appears to be a nec-
essary precondition for participation in globali-
zation. In a stable macroeconomic environment,
investment can be expected to be higher because
risks are contained. More investment enlarges
the stock of capital per worker, increases labor
productivity, and produces higher incomes in the
long-run. The second panel in Figure 7 indeed
reveals that low-inflation East Asia displays an
outstanding investment performance among
DCs.
6
9 Yet, the case of Central Europe demon-
strates that high investment does not guarantee
successful economic development. In this region,
centrally planned investment resulted in alloca-
tive distortions so that productivity growth re-
mained sluggish until the regime shift. Moreo-
ver, physical capital accumulation is not all that
matters. Human capital formation may be even
more important as a driving force of economic
growth. This is all the more so in the global
economy, where the diffusion of new technolo-
gies is advanced by declining information and
transaction costs. The lower panel in Figure 7,
which presents average years of education as an
indicator of human capital accumulation, sup-
ports this consideration at least partly: Among
DCs, East Asia is again the best performing re-
gion. This indicator also suggests that Central
Europe may face favorable prospects to become
integrated into the globalization strategies of
TNCs.
More systematic evidence for the hypothesis
that formal education plays a leading role for an
explanation of economic success comes from re-
cent empirical cross-country studies (Barro
1991; Manki et al. 1992; Gundlach 1995).
These studies uniformly confirm that human
capital formation is at least as important as
physical capital formation for explaining the
large differences in per capita income between
industrialized countries and DCs. They also sup-
port theoretical models which predict that eco-
nomic backwardness is not necessarily a perma-
nent state of affairs. Low-income countries have
the chance to realize higher growth rates than
rich countries, because they can use existing
technologies rather than having to invent them.
The predicted and estimated speed of conver-
gence is fairly slow (2 percent per year or even
less), so that this "natural" catching-up process
alone does not suffice to realize substantial
improvements in the standard of living within
reasonable periods of time. The East Asian
example reveals, however, that there are ways to
speed up convergence. Integration into the inter-
national division of labor appears to be crucially
important in this respect.
Overall, East Asia's success in becoming an
attractive location for international businesses
seems to be related to a combination of short-
and long-run factors which can be shaped by do-
mestic economic policies. Macroeconomic sta-
bility is a matter of government budget dis-
cipline, the rate of investment is a question of
business conditions, and the amount of compul-
sory formal education reflects the government's
attitude towards the provision of public goods.
A priori, there is no reason why Asian-type suc-
cess stories should not happen in other parts of
the world, say in Latin America or in Eastern
Europe.
II. The Role of New Technologies
As concerns the future prospects of DCs to par-
ticipate successfully in globalization, there is
widespread agreement that continuous acquisi-
tion of technological and managerial know-how
is a critical factor. Government policy plays a
twofold role in facilitating technological prog-
ress (Agarwal et al. 1995). First, international
trade and exchange rate policies affect many of
the channels through which the transfer of for-
eign technologies may take place. Second, the
successful application of new technologies de-
pends on local technological capability, namely
the ability to select, adapt, diffuse, and build
upon imported technology. Local technological
capability, in turn, is influenced by government
policy in several areas, most prominently in edu-
cation.
Different forms of technology transfer may be
classified by the demands they make on the
user's technological capability and, correspond-
ingly, on the intensity of the relationship be-
tween the supplier and the user of the transferred
technology. One extreme is represented by FDI33
in the form of turnkey plants where the new
technology is not only supplied by, but also used
under the direct control of the parent company.
Initially at least, there may be little reliance on
local inputs other than labor, and limited scope
for technological learning. By contrast, technol-
ogy licensing and the purchase of equipment em-
bodying new technology involve more of an
arm's length relationship between suppliers and
users. The efficient use of these channels de-
pends on the user's ability to obtain and process
sufficient information to choose among available
techniques, and to adapt the new technology to
local conditions with only limited support from
the supplier. This applies even more strongly to
technological information obtained from custo-
mers, especially foreign importers, or from sour-
ces in the public domain.
Some observers fear that new manufacturing
techniques will render it more difficult for DCs
to attract foreign capital in the future. New tech-
nology encompasses innovations in hardware,
such as new machinery, and software, such as
organization, business administration, and mar-
keting. To be successfully applied, these new
technologies may require complementary human
skills being in short supply in most DCs.
Freeman and Hagedoorn (1994) argue that tech-
nological capabilities are extremely unevenly
distributed in the world economy. About two
thirds of worldwide R&D efforts take place
within the Triad, whereas DCs only account for
about 5 percent of global R&D (the rest is main-
ly military and aerospace R&D by the former
Soviet bloc). A similar picture emerges for pa-
tents. According to this most frequently applied
indicator, the combined share of DCs in global
technological output would amount to about 1-3
percent. However, the minor overall role of DCs
in technological development obscures different
trends at the regional level. R&D expenditures
of Asian NIEs were growing rapidly in the
1980s, and their patenting activities began to
rise. This is in contrast to Latin American DCs,
where no improvement could be identified (Free-
man and Hagedoorn 1994). Moreover, the at-
tractiveness of DCs for foreign capital primarily
depends on their capabilities in applying existing
technologies, rather than on their role in produc-
ing technological output. As was shown before,
many DCs have made substantial progress in the
former respect.
Another question is whether DCs actually re-
ceive technologies that fit their factor endow-
ments. What can be expected in a globalizing
economy is that NIEs should receive a higher
share of advanced technologies than less ad-
vanced LDCs. Table 11 provides some empirical
evidence derived from the MERIT data base
with regard to the relative importance of so-
called core technologies in (international) inter-
firm technology partnering. It is widely accepted
that information technology, biotechnology, and
new materials constitute the heart of many fu-
ture technological developments affecting manu-
facturing, but also many services. Technology
partnering within developed countries, and es-
pecially within the Triad, is dominated by these
three core technologies. Core technologies ac-
count for about half of all partnerships between
Triad and NIE companies, while two thirds of
all partnerships involving LDCs are in areas
other than core technologies. This pattern sup-
ports the view that the focus of technological
cooperation is related to factor endowments of
partners.
Table 11 — The Share of Core Technologies in Interna-




















aInformation technology, biotechnology, new materials.
Source: Freeman and Hagedoorn (1994).
From the lower level of technological coop-
eration between industrialized countries and
DCs it cannot be concluded that DCs do not
have access to advanced technologies (see Sec-
tion C.I). Rather, interfirm cooperation in high-
tech sectors is a suboptimal means to transfer
technology between partners at considerably dif-
ferent stages of economic development. Interfirm34
agreements on technology cooperation are just
one way of technology transfer. Alternative
means appear to be more appropriate for DCs
attempting to improve their technological ca-
pabilities. Other channels include arm's length
types of NEC, imports of machinery and capital
goods, and FDI by TNCs.
In some cases, the import of foreign technol-
ogy by DCs has been complemented by autono-
mous domestic efforts to develop technology.
The Taiwanese computer industry provides an
example (San 1992). Notwithstanding the sig-
nificant role of the Taiwanese computer industry
on world markets, the majority of its constituent
enterprises are small or of medium size. These
SMEs have responded flexibly to market
changes, but are largely incapable of developing
advanced technologies on their own. Therefore,
the major firms in this industry decided to form
a so-called "technology development alliance" in
1989. The aim was to create specific computer
chip technologies, which required the establish-
ment of a microelectronic laboratory with high
quality standards, and the engagement of more
than 200 engineers and technicians. This project
was initiated and directed by the government-
sponsored Industrial Technology Research Insti-
tution, while the costs had to be shared by those
firms interested in joining. In the case of Tai-
wan, joint efforts in developing new technology
have spread to other industries as well, for in-
stance to automobile manufacturing and consu-
mer electronics.
Finally, a larger flow of technology through
NEC to DCs in the 1980s was hindered by pol-
icy disincentives in DCs, rather than by a natu-
ral tendency for technology concentration in in-
dustrialized countries. Some support for this
proposition may be derived from a survey of
enterprises which engage in licensing their tech-
nology internationally (Vickery 1988).
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0 One
half of all respondents reported that government
regulations, foreign exchange controls, and in-
adequate industrial-property-rights protection
had prevented agreements from being reached;
three quarters mentioned that they had caused
undue delays.
7
1 Enterprises engaged in licensing
are typically involved in other kinds of technol-
ogy transfer activities at the same time, such as
joint ventures, sales of technology, and technical
service contracts.
7
2 This suggests that the same
policy-induced obstacles which hindered tech-
nology flows through licensing are responsible
for limited technology flows in other areas of
NEC.
III. Regionalization, Globalization, and
Convergence
Some authors claim that there is no general trend
towards globalization involving DCs. They ar-
gue that a tendency towards regional production
and sourcing networks will impair the chances
of DCs to benefit from technology transfers
(Oman 1994). This would imply that DCs face
the risk of being excluded from the growth dy-
namics of globalization if they do not join re-
gional groupings. The empirical evidence pre-
sented above does not support this view. While
regional networking does play an important role
with respect to both NEC and FDI, Chapters C
and D clearly show that global networking, too,
is on the rise. Furthermore, the fact that not all
DCs have participated in globalization so far
cannot be attributed to regionalization. The most
dynamic DCs are not those with the closest links
to formal regional integration schemes such as
NAFTA or EU. Rather, Asian DCs did prosper
most rapidly without enjoying preferential treat-
ment in, and locational proximity to, the large
European and American markets.
In essence, the main culprit for lacking inte-
gration into the world economy is a misguided
domestic economic policy. Yet inappropriate
economic policies can be changed. This implies
that the trend towards globalization is highly
unlikely to establish a two-camp world, where
many DCs are caught in a poverty trap. To the
contrary, globalization can be expected to fur-
ther increase the long-run tendency towards fac-
tor price equalization. This does not only apply
for the mobile factors of production, but in-
creasingly also for the less mobile factors of
production, such as labor. The implication for
industrialized countries is that especially wages
of low-skilled workers will have to decline —
not necessarily in absolute amounts, but in re-35
lation to wages of high-skilled workers and in
relation to the rate of return on capital. Con-
versely, the implication for DCs is that average
wages will rise as the supply of capital in-
creases. This reasoning is supported by the
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem of international
trade theory. In practice, it may be difficult to
quantify the resulting effects exactly, but it is
hard to maintain that globalization has nothing
to do with labor market problems of rich coun-
tries. Once this impact is acknowledged, there
must be an impact on DCs, too.
One piece of evidence supporting the pre-
sumed labor market impact of globalization
comes from economic history. Over the past
century and a half, real wages converged be-
tween Europe and the developing economies of
the day, i.e., Canada, the US, Argentina, and
Australia, and also within Europe (Williamson
1995). Rather strong convergence of real wages
for unskilled workers can be observed for 1870-
1913, which was a period of comparatively high
macroeconomic stability under the gold stan-
dard, and of exceptionally high international
mobility of labor, capital and goods. The present
situation is almost the same, except that labor
mobility is restricted. For a tendency towards
factor price equalization to prevail, it is suffi-
cient that capital and goods are mobile interna-
tionally. In the era of globalization, this is ex-
actly what happens as a result of new technolo-
gies and declining transaction costs. The histori-
cal record thus suggests that globalization pro-
vides excellent opportunities for DCs.
Another piece of evidence comes from ob-
served changes in relative prices. The globaliza-
tion hypothesis implies that the relative price of
goods produced with a relatively large amount
of low-skilled labor should decline on world
markets, while the relative price of human-capi-
tal-intensive goods should rise. The prediction of
trade theory is confirmed at least for the US,
which constitute a relatively large and open mar-
ket (Learner 1993; Nunnenkamp et al. 1994):
The relative price of labor-intensive goods like
clothing has fallen compared with the prices of
human-capital-intensive goods like automobiles
and machinery.
IV. Protectionism in Industrialized
Countries
The evidence in favor of the predicted link be-
tween globalization and factor price equalization
implies favorable opportunities for catching-up
of DCs. Nevertheless, globalization also bears a
threat for DCs, at least in the short run. The rea-
son is protectionism of industrialized countries.
Protection aims at increasing the income of the
relatively scarce factor of production, i.e., the
factor that is most used in imports. Industrial-
ized countries have erected trade barriers to pre-
serve jobs in their low-skill industries. Likewise,
many DCs have applied all sorts of regulations
and capital controls in the past, to preserve rents
for owners of domestic human and physical
capital. Yet in both cases, the net result is a loss
of welfare, because resources have not been al-
located efficiently.
Apparently for fear of giving support to pro-
tectionist arguments, some economists have tried
to downplay the link between globalization and
labor markets (Krugman and Lawrence 1994;
Lawrence and Slaughter 1993). This is a some-
what dangerous misconception, however. Instead
it should be emphasized that economic analysis
confirms first, that there are losers as well as
gainers from globalization, and second, that pro-
tection is inferior to other ways of supporting the
losers (Wood 1995). This applies to both indus-
trialized countries and DCs. Capital poor DCs
should encourage, rather than restrict the inflow
of capital; capital rich industrialized countries
have to change their production structure away
from low-skill intensive manufacturing indus-
tries towards sophisticated lines of production
in which there is less competition from fast-
growing DCs.
True, the necessary structural change will not
come for free. It may create higher unemploy-
ment as long as low-skilled workers do not find
new jobs, or turn themselves into more skilled
workers. But it is unlikely that structural change
can be halted for long by protection, since capi-
tal and technology have become more mobile.
Nor does structural change imply that today's
rich countries will completely lose their indus-
trial base to newly industrializing DCs. Despite36
much talk about a general trend towards a serv-
ice economy, the value added share of manufac-
turing in GDP (measured at constant prices) is
remarkably constant over time for OECD coun-
tries (Gundlach 1993). The same result was
found by Kuznets (1966) in his seminal analysis
of long-run structural change 30 years ago.
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Yet what has changed are the employment
shares of manufacturing, which steadily decline
as a result of stronger productivity growth in
this sector than in other sectors such as services.
Hence, structural change induced by globaliza-
tion implies an employment shift towards the
service sector in industrialized countries. A
similar development will occur in relatively ad-
vanced DCs, since they have to cope with the
same kind of competition from below as present-
day industrialized countries.
F. Summary and Conclusions
The current debate on globalization focuses on
implications for labor markets in industrialized
countries. Concerns are widespread that earn-
ings and employment prospects especially of
low-skilled workers in these countries are threat-
ened by intensified worldwide competition on the
markets for goods, services, technology and
capital. If globalization significantly affects to-
day's leading economies, it follows logically that
its impact on the economic prospects of DCs
must be far-reaching as well. The DC perspec-
tive has been largely ignored in academic and
public debate so far.
For DCs, the relevant questions are: Does
globalization foster or retard their industrializa-
tion? Will fiercer competition and greater mo-
bility of production factors end up in a deepen-
ing divide between rich and poor countries? Or
is the era of globalization a time of unprece-
dented opportunity for DCs? Overall, the find-
ings of this study suggest an affirmative answer
to the last question. The successful industriali-
zation of many DCs indeed appears to be one of
the major reasons for globalization. Yet globali-
zation involves risks not only for industrialized
countries, but also for DCs. Some DCs do face
the threat of being delinked from the worldwide
division of labor. As a result, their attractiveness
for internationally mobile factors of production
may further decline, unless domestic policy re-
forms will turn the tide.
Any evaluation of the chances of DCs to
benefit from worldwide trends has to consider
that globalization proceeds in various ways.
Globalization implies first of all that trade ex-
pands relative to production, and that FDI grows
even faster than trade. However, non-equity
forms of international investment cooperation
(NEC) — including licensing, joint ventures
with foreign minority participation, offshore
processing and strategic alliances — must not be
ignored. The specific modes applied by enter-
prises going global mainly depend on industry-
and product-specific characteristics, as well as
on policy interventions. FDI tends to be pre-
ferred as a means to retain full ownership con-
trol in industries producing differentiated goods
and applying sophisticated technologies. Certain
types of NEC may be favored when human
skills are embodied in capital goods and produc-
tion processes are standardized. Government in-
terference may limit the choices open to enter-
prises and, thereby, cause substitution effects
between different modes of globalization. Basi-
cally, however, the evidence suggests that FDI
and NEC complement each other.
The chances of DCs to become involved in
the international division of labor differ between
the various modes of globalization. For obvious
reasons, their participation in interfirm agree-
ments on technology cooperation is weak at
best. This type of NEC is essentially restricted
to fairly advanced partners with a similar level
of technological capability. Notably joint R&D
activities are unlikely to involve DC firms, as a
relatively low innovative capacity is just one of
the constituent properties of DCs. DC firms play
a larger role when it comes to NEC agreements
in more mature industries, in which market-
related motives are underlying most cooperative37
ventures. This does not imply that DCs are de-
linked from technology transfers. Rather, inter-
firm cooperation is not the optimal means for
integrating DCs into globalization strategies
with regard to R&D. Technology transfers be-
tween rich and poor countries mainly occur
through FDI, which allows the investing firm to
maintain control over firm-specific assets.
Recent trends in FDI indeed strongly support
the proposition that DCs have become closely
integrated into globalization strategies. In the
early 1990s, DCs attracted about one third of
worldwide FDI flows. Booming FDI resulted in
a tenfold rise in their FDI-to-export ratio since
1980. Various DC groups benefited from this
favorable development to a significantly differ-
ent degree, however. Globalization through FDI
proceeded mainly in East and Southeast Asia. At
the same time, Latin American locations such as
Mexico resumed their role in global sourcing
and marketing strategies of TNCs, and Central
Europe emerged as a new competitor for foreign
risk capital. By contrast, the risk of being de-
linked from globalization trends appears to be
particularly high for Sub-Saharan Africa.
The contention that the integration into the
world economy progressed most rapidly in Asian
DCs is underscored by case studies of selected
manufacturing industries. At the same time, glo-
balization was not restricted to a narrowly de-
fined group of DCs in the sectors considered:
- Least surprisingly, DCs are hosting a particu-
larly large share of world production in the
relatively labor-intensive textiles and clothing
industries. More importantly, though, many DCs
succeeded to increase their production share
over time, and to achieve international
competitiveness in both textiles and clothing.
The example of clothing strongly supports the
view that even lower-income DCs may join the
globalization club. More advanced DCs are
increasingly losing their comparative advantage
in this particularly labor-intensive segment.
These DCs have relocated production to lower-
income countries, which then emerged as most
competitive suppliers of clothing on OECD
markets. Likewise, newcomers in Asia, Latin
America and Central Europe have benefited
from non-equity forms of production sharing
with Japanese, US and. EU companies. Their
integration into the worldwide division of labor
will be further enhanced with MFA trade being
reintegrated into the GATT/WTO framework.
- While some huge OECD-based TNCs con-
tinue to dominate globalization in chemicals,
DCs got increasingly involved in this physical-
capital-intensive industry. This refers to
relatively advanced Asian NIEs in the first
place. Different factor intensities explain why
the number of DCs which successfully pene-
trated OECD markets is smaller in chemicals
than in textiles and clothing. FDI has greatly
supported the integration of emerging chemical
producers into world markets. In major Asian
and Latin American host countries, the chemical
industry attracted a significant proportion of
overall FDI inflows, ranking first or second
among manufacturing industries. High growth
projections for Asian chemical markets are
likely to further enhance the attractiveness of
this region for both FDI and NEC.
- Relatively sophisticated technologies and hu-
man skill requirements render it more difficult
for DCs to participate in globalized production
of motor vehicles. Nevertheless, some advanced
DCs have emerged as new competitors in this
industry, and their share in world production of
both finished cars and autoparts has increased
significantly. Especially in Latin America, this is
mainly due to globalization through FDI by
TNCs based in Triad economies. FDI was less
important in Asia, but the development of local
automobile production has been supported by
establishing international links in this region as
well. Licensing and similar interfirm
arrangements were most important in this
respect. Whatever the future shape of the
world's motor vehicle industry will be, some
non-traditional locations in the Far East, Latin
America and Central Europe appear to be well
prepared to meet the competitive challenges.
All in all, the findings of this study contrast
with the widespread belief that only few DCs
may benefit from globalization. Rather, the
chances of newcomers have been further im-
proved since recently, with advanced DCs in-38
creasingly becoming source countries of FDI.
With rising per capita income and wages, these
countries are shifting towards more sophisti-
cated lines of production and relocating labor-
intensive activities to lower-income DCs. This
provides the latter with new opportunities for
catching-up.
Yet it mainly depends on the domestic eco-
nomic policy framework whether newcomers
will succeed in joining the globalization club.
From the experience of the frontrunners among
DCs, some basic policy conclusions emerge.
First, and most obviously, openness towards
world markets is a precondition for becoming
involved in the globalization strategies of TNCs.
Openness has several dimensions:
- Latecomers should join the current trend of
liberalizing FDI regulations, in order to make
use of foreign capital as an engine of eco-
nomic growth.
- Policy disincentives which discourage foreign
companies to transfer technology through li-
censing and similar arrangements should be
removed. Thereby, the so far limited inflow of
technology by means of NEC may be en-
larged.
- Import liberalization is becoming more impor-
tant for preventing a policy induced anti-ex-
port bias, as outright export subsidies have to
be phased out under the new WTO rules. The
removal of trade barriers encourages an effi-
cient allocation of resources and, hence, im-
proves the locational attractiveness for glo-
balized production.
Second, under conditions of globalized pro-
duction, national governments are increasingly
constrained in pursuing economic policies of
their own liking. Experience strongly suggests
that DCs characterized by pronounced macro-
economic instability are relatively unattractive
locations for international investors. It follows
that inflation, which is the most obvious sign of
unstable economic conditions, has to be kept at
bay. Fiscal consolidation is most important in
this respect, because high government budget
deficits are typically a major reason for high in-
flation. Likewise, tax rates, especially business
taxes, must be moderate and levied on a broad
tax base in order not to impair the incentive to
invest.
Third, investment in physical and human
capital plays a crucial role in enabling DCs to
participate in globalization. Enlarging the physi-
cal capital stock per worker increases labor pro-
ductivity, which renders it easier to become in-
ternationally competitive and to attract foreign
capital. Capital inflows, in turn, may supple-
ment domestic investment funds. In order to
benefit from this process of mutually reinforcing
factors, economic policies that discourage do-
mestic saving and investment must be avoided.
In addition to fiscal and monetary discipline, fi-
nancial market reforms are highly relevant in
this respect, notably in DCs which are still char-
acterized by financial repression and inefficient
intermediation between savers and investors.
Otherwise, such DCs may end up in a vicious
circle of low and unproductive domestic invest-
ment and declining attractiveness for foreign
capital.
Human capital formation is at least as impor-
tant as physical capital accumulation. This is all
the more so under conditions of globalization,
which enhances technological diffusion because
of declining transaction and information costs.
Governments have an important role to play in
attracting new technologies and adjusting to
technological change. While the import of tech-
nology requires appropriate trade and exchange
rate policies, its successful application basically
depends on available human skills and, thus, on
government efforts towards better education of
the workforce.
Finally, globalization has proceeded along
with renewed interest in regional integration
schemes in both developing and industrialized
countries. Obviously, institutionalized links of
newcomers in globalization with major econo-
mies such as the EU and the US may help the
former to become integrated into the interna-
tional division of labor. Central Europe is a case
in point: Economic transformation was rendered
easier by preferential trade arrangements and
access to foreign capital offered under the asso-
ciation agreements with the EU. This does not
imply, however, that DCs deprived of such for-
tunate external conditions are going to be ex-39
eluded from the growth dynamics of globaliza-
tion. The experiences of Asian DCs on the one
hand, and the ACP group on the other hand sug-
gest that institutionalized links to major integra-
tion schemes are neither necessary nor sufficient
for economic progress. The involvement of
Asian DCs in globalization is most advanced,
although they remained outside integration
schemes. By contrast, ACP countries did not
make much progress, notwithstanding preferen-
tial access to EU markets. Regional integration
is no substitute for reforming domestic policies
where these are still inappropriate to reap bene-
fits from globalization. Openness and a suffi-
cient provision of public goods must figure high
on the policy agenda.40
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of the US.
3
6 Production data are from UNIDO's data base. They represent deflated value added in manufacturing industries,
converted to 1990 US dollars.
3
7 Data are from UN (1994b).
3
8 Again, distortions may arise from MFA restrictions. This is because MFA regulations have tended to be most
damaging for the most competitive DC exporters (see, e.g., Spinanger 1993).
' In the OECD statistics used for the calculations in Table 5, the larger part of the increase of Latin America's market
share is not allocated to specific countries in this region.
4
0 For more detailed accounts along similar lines, see OECD (1994a) and EIU (various issues).
4
1 The following observations are drawn from various contributions in ADB (1993) and from OECD (1994c).
4
2 One underlying motive was to circumvent quota restrictions. Hence, it may be argued that the MFA has in fact
enhanced the globalization of textile and doming production, notably in Asia (Oman 1989: 237; Nunnenkamp et al.
1994:74). '
4
3 Note, however, that the extent to which privileged partner countries succeeded in this respect depended critically on
domestic investment conditions. Free access to EU manufacturing markets did not prevent the continuous decline of
the ACP share in EU imports (Hiemenz et al. 1994: Table 2).
4
4 Processed clothing exports to the EU doubled within three years to ECU 1.3 billion in 1992, 80 percent of which were
from Poland, Hungary and Romania (Nunnenkamp et al. 1994: 76).
Its share was particularly high in German FDI stocks (37 percent of all manufacturing industries in 1992) (Deutsche
Bundesbank 1994). The corresponding shares amounted to 23 percent for the US by the end of 1993 and 14 percent for
Japan by March 1993 (US Department of Commerce 1994; Ministry of Finance 1993).
4
6 As in the case of textiles and clothing, Eastern Europe suffered from declining production shares in the early 1990s,
i.e., during transition to a market economy.
4
7 The contribution of SITC 5 to total DC exports nearly tripled from 1.8 to 4.8 percent, while its share in world exports
increased only modestly from 7 to 9.1 percent (UN 1994b).
The Republic of South Africa is included under non-OECD sources in the trade statistics on which Table 7 is based,
whereas this country was not considered in Table 6.
The weak representation of German investors in Asian DCs is not restricted to chemicals, but rather a general feature
of past FDI patterns (Agarwal et al. 1991).
-
5
0 It is noteworthy that the P.R. of China's share in Japanese FDI in chemicals was still relatively low by the end of 1992.42
The relevant information is available for five host countries in Asia and two host countries in Latin America (OECD
1994b; OECD 1994c). Figures in the text refer to the 1988-1992 period, except for Argentina (1990-1992), Singapore
and South Korea (1988-1991).
^
2 For details, see Nunnenkamp et al. (1994: 67f., Table A6) and the literature given there.
^
3 Infringements of property rights by DCs have been widespread especially with regard to Pharmaceuticals. For a
detailed discussion of this issue, which is beyond the scope of this study, see OECD (1992: 77ff.).
^
4 The sector's contribution to overseas FDI stocks in manufacturing amounted to 13.1 and 17.6 percent for the US and
Germany, respectively. Comparable data for other major automobile producing countries are not available.
^ The FDI-to-export ratio was lower in Germany (2.7 percent) than in the US (5.2 percent). Exports relate to SITC 78
and are from OECD (various issues).
Note that data on Taiwanese production are missing. Smaller assembly operations in DCs are ignored in the following.
Frequently, they are due to restrictions imposed on imports of finished cars. They are, thus, hardly relevant in the
context of globalization.
5
7 For example, projections are reported in OECD (1992: 41f.), according to which non-OECD countries were expected
to account for about 16 percent of worldwide production of motor vehicles by 2000.
•
i
8 In addition to the Malaysian car Proton Saga, ASEAN countries have recurrently attempted to push the "ASEAN car"
project.
59 However, the increase of production shares of Mexico and South Korea is somewhat overstated because of missing
entries for some producers (notably Germany) in 1992.
This share was higher than in Germany (24 percent) and Japan (18 percent), whereas components and parts accounted
for nearly half of automotive exports by the US.
In 1990, about 13 percent of Korea's total automotive exports consisted of parts and accessories (VDA 1994: 335).
6
2 Note that SITC 78 includes autoparts.
6
3 Brazil's motor vehicle industry has suffered from FDI outflows since 1988, which has probably been due to
deteriorating investment conditions (notably as compared with Mexico).
6
4 All DCs hosted 27 percent of total German FDI stocks in the motor vehicle industry.
However, Japanese equity participation in joint ventures with Indian manufacturers has introduced modem technology
into India's motor vehicle industry. As a result, this rather "moribund ... industry has been reinvigorated" (D'Costa
1995: 486).
6
6 Li 1980-1986, Korean parts producers formed 21 joint ventures and concluded 160 technology licensing agreements
with OECD companies (OECD 1992: 53).
For details, see Nunnenkamp et al. (1994) and the literature given there.
For each region, the five economies with the largest populations are considered, except for Sub-Saharan Africa, where
Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda have been excluded because of data limitations.
' It should be noted that high investment rates usually reflect high domestic savings. This is so because the difference
between investment and domestic savings equals the current account deficit, which rarely exceeds 5 percent of GDP
over longer time periods.
7
0 As a general pattern, licensing was found to be concentrated on industrialized countries and Asian DCs.
By contrast, only one quarter of respondents experienced problems in licensing out their technology within their home
countries.
7
2 For Greece, it was found that licensing was complementary to other forms of technology transfer, mainly through FDI
(Giannitsis 1991). In many cases, licensing was the preferred instrument for entering the Greek market before deciding
on other engagements such as subsidiaries, share participation, or acquisition of licensee firms.
For example, the value added share of manufacturing has remained fairly constant at about 20 percent in the US during
1970—1992, in Germany it declined from 40 to 35 percent, and in Japan it increased from 26 to 34 percent. For fast
growing DCs, such as South Korea and Malaysia, this share has strongly increased, thereby largely offsetting the
decline in the share of agriculture, whereas no significant changes can be observed for services (World Bank 1994d).43
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